The Voice of Mirza Xazar: Category Current events

AZERBAIJAN: BUILDING COLLAPSE EXPOSES "CHAOS" IN BAKU’S URBAN PLANNING (EurasiaNet)

Mirza Khazar — Wed, 12 Sep 2007 13:09:00 -0400

Rovshan Ismayilov 9/06/07

The recent collapse of an apartment building in downtown Baku is fueling an increasingly acrimonious public debate in Azerbaijan about government corruption and competence.

Some 20 construction workers, all from outside Baku, were killed on August 28 when the nearly completed building on Mukhtarov Street in the capital’s Yasamal neighborhood, one of hundreds of structures erected amid a seven-year building boom, suddenly imploded, sending tons of debris crashing to the ground. The Ministry of Emergency Situations has attributed the cause of the collapse to uneven foundations and low-quality construction work.

The director and three managers of Mutefekkir Company, the firm responsible for the building, are now under arrest. On September 5, the head of the Baku city government department for apartments and cooperative buildings, which oversees such construction projects, was also taken into custody on abuse-of-power charges.

The tragedy has intensified a longstanding debate about the government’s ability to uphold construction safety standards - a critical question in this earthquake-prone city. Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, who heads a government commission looking into the building’s collapse, told reporters on August 31 that Mutefekkir Company had permits only for the building’s design, not its construction. A day earlier, Baku City Prosecutor Aziz Seidov revealed that the building’s foundation had been designed to support only nine stories. In addition, approval for the final design plan was never given.

Nonetheless, construction on the building has been underway since 2002 - a fact that is fueling public anger. A court order that year banning work on the site was later overturned by a Baku appeals court.

"You need authorization from up to 40 government bodies to begin the construction of a building in Baku. If you start construction of a garage in your courtyard without proper permission, it will be destroyed by bulldozers the next morning. How is it possible to build a 16-storey building in the city center without authorization?" commented Rauf Mirkadirov, a political columnist for the pro-opposition Zerkalo daily.

Like many other observers, Mirkadirov believes the tragedy is linked to widespread corruption in Azerbaijan. "Either the company owners paid big bribes during all these years to not be touched, or the company was backed by very high-ranking officials. There are no other ways possible," Mirkadirov said.

Government officials and pro-government politicians are more cautious. General Prosecutor Zahid Garalov told reporters on September 1 that his office "is conducting a detailed investigation of the tragedy’s causes," adding that "[i]t is too early to make conclusions." Those responsible for the event "will be punished," he insisted.

While professing to be baffled by the project’s permit-free status, Aydin Mirzazade, an MP affiliated with the governing Yeni Azerbaijan Party, also was quick to call for justice. "I believe all those who are guilty have to be punished regardless of their positions or influence."

Some construction experts, however, are calling for more -- the resignation of Baku Mayor Hajibala Abutalibov. Terming the tragedy Abutalibov’s "personal responsibility," Emil Akhundov, the former head of Baku’s main construction department, told EurasiaNet that "chaos" exists in the city’s urban planning. Companies, he alleged, do not follow construction specifications, use sub-standard materials as substitutes for those in short supply and hire untrained laborers for jobs that demand a high level of building skills. "There is no other way, but to stop all residential building in Azerbaijan until order [is] restored in this sector," he said.

Neither the city nor national government has yet responded to the criticism of Baku’s urban planning process. Authorities, however, have announced since the building collapse that an additional 74 new buildings erected in Baku have been inhabited "without the proper authorization." Eight buildings under construction (seven in Baku, one in Ganja) in Azerbaijan have entirely or partially collapsed since the start of the year, killing 40 people.

Meanwhile, even as it urges caution in drawing conclusions, the government has taken steps to show that it is responding. On August 31 a presidential decree was issued that gives additional authority to the Ministry of Emergency Situations to intervene in construction projects - a move designed to assure quality standards. The decree also confirms the Ministry of Labor’s responsibility for ensuring construction workers’ rights and workplace safety.

Compensation is also planned. On September 5, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to allocate 10,000 manats (about $11,700) to the families of workers killed in the incident. Families of injured workers will receive 3,000 manats (about $3,500).

Whether such measures will allay popular concerns remains to be seen. Ilgar Mammadov, an independent Baku-based political analyst, believes that the catastrophe is symptomatic of a broad failure of governance in Azerbaijan. To support his argument he pointed to a court decision that allowed construction to continue, despite an attempt at intervention by officials. "A representative of the Labor Ministry said [the ministry] wanted to check the existence of labor contracts ... but they were not allowed to do it. It means that the construction mafia in Azerbaijan is more powerful than executive authorities."

Meanwhile, opposition politicians are calling for the resignation of the Emergency Situations Minister Kamaleddin Heydarov, a longtime political target. Heydarov had earlier promised that his ministry, which exercises control over the quality and safety of all building construction, would keep a tighter watch on new buildings. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The relatives of workers who died in the crash have also expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the ministry’s recovery operations. At an August 31 protest in Baku, villagers from Archivan in the southern Astara region, home to most of the killed workers, demanded that they be allowed themselves to join the recovery effort. Five bodies are still believed to be lying under the rubble.

Orudjali Hajiyev, the deputy minister of emergency situations, has rejected the relatives’ criticism, saying that rescue team members were working with heavy machinery, and had to proceed carefully. Work at the site will be finished within a few days, he told APA news agency on September 5. "We are doing our best," he said.

With over 1,200 new buildings approved for construction since January 2007, the chances of another tragic collapse would appear to be high. Ali Kerimli, who heads the opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, sarcastically noted that "the construction sector has turned into a second battlefield for the Azerbaijani people."

Editor’s Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in Baku.

OSCE Office welcomes use of European Court of Human Rights' opinions in case against Azerbaijani journalist

Mirza Khazar — Thu, 19 Jul 2007 12:21:00 -0400

Press release BAKU, 17 July 2007 - The OSCE Office in Baku noted with satisfaction the reference to the European Court of Human Rights in yesterday's decision by the Yasamal District court to dismiss criminal defamation charges against the editor-in-chief of the opposition Azadliq (Freedom) newspaper. "If the use of the European Court of Human Rights case law becomes generalized in Azerbaijan's courts, we will witness a significant improvement in the situation of freedom of the media in the country," said Ambassador Jose-Luis Herrero, Head of the OSCE Office. "We fully encourage this trend. The European Court rulings provide the appropriate balance between protecting individual reputations and upholding freedom of expression." The court ruling emphasizes that Azerbaijan is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. This means that the interpretation of the European Convention should be applied while considering domestic court cases. Referring to Strasbourg case law, the court concluded that "freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society" and "that information or ideas that even offend, shock or disturb should be protected." "It is only logical that national courts apply case law of a higher jurisdiction, as it is the European Court of Human Rights, which might be called to decide on the cases at a later stage," said Ambassador Jose-Luis Herrero. The charges against Ganimat Zahid stemmed from the article "Stone Comes Across Rock" published in the Azadliq newspaper in May. The article was written based on a letter from Imishli Region Railroad Station employee to Azadlig's editorial office which alleged that the station chief was misusing State property. http://www.osce.org/baku/item_1_25654.html

Reporters Without Borders: Court to hear appeal of two journalists imprisoned for libelling president’s uncle

Mirza Khazar — Thu, 05 Jul 2007 13:27:00 -0400

Reporters Without Borders today urged the judicial authorities to reconsider the 30-month prison sentences imposed on journalists Yashar Agazadeh and Rovshan Kabirli of the daily Mukhalifat when their appeal hearing begins tomorrow. Agazadeh has been on hunger strike in prison against their conviction on 20 May of libelling the president’s uncle, Djalal Aliev, in an article linking him to possible corruption. “The laws must be amended as a matter of urgency so that journalists are no longer sentenced to jail terms that are out of all proportion to the offence,” the press freedom organisation said. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- New crackdown on opposition media Reporters Without Borders today strongly denounced a recent wave of restrictions and repression targeting Azerbaijan’s independent media and urged the authorities to restore press freedom. It said it was “very concerned” about yesterday’s assertion by the head of President Ilham Aliev’s office, Ramiz Mehdiyev, that there were normal democratic freedoms in the country and said it hoped he would quickly change his attitude and take all steps to ensure freedom of expression. “It is unthinkable that such a senior official can publicly say this when everyday facts show that the media is under pressure.” Ali Hasanov, another top Aliev aide, said while attending a conference on democracy in societies in transition yesterday that “we have an independent media and freedom of expression here. The opinion of some NGOs that there are pressures on the media in Azerbaijan is just an opinion.” He said the recent imprisonment of several journalists was justified and that growing international criticism of the government’s actions was groundless. The offices of two opposition newspapers, the Russian-language Realny Azerbaijan and the Azeri-language Gundalik Azerbaijan, were shut down by the ministry of emergency situations on 20 May, officially because of security problems with the electrical system and building-evacuation procedure. But Uzeyir Jafarov, editor of Realny Azebaijan, said it was really because of what the papers had printed. Their offices were searched and computers seized. Jafarov, who was beaten up in April after attending a controversial trial, said today it was “impossible to live and work” in Azerbaijan. He said he and five other journalists would try to make democratic countries aware of what was going on by applying for political asylum in Austria, Canada, Finland and Norway. The founder of the two papers, Eynulla Fatullayev, was imprisoned in Bayil after being sentenced on 20 April to two and a half years for supposed libel. He may now be convicted of “incitement to terrorism” under article 214 of the criminal code, though his lawyer said he had not yet been interrogated about this. His family received an anonymous phone call on 17 May warning that he would be killed if he continued to take the same positions after he was released. Two journalists of the daily Mukhalifat, Rovshan Karbili and Yashar Agazade, were also each sentenced to two and half years in prison on 20 May for an article accusing members of President Aliev’s family of corruption. Miklos Haraszti, the media freedom representative of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), yesterday deplored the crackdown and called on the government to drop all the prosecutions. Reporters Without Borders defends imprisoned journalists and press freedom throughout the world. It has nine national sections (Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). It has representatives in Bangkok, London, New York, Tokyo and Washington. And it has more than 120 correspondents worldwide.

EXPERTS: AZERBAIJAN MILITARY BUILD-UP FOR DIPLOMATIC, DOMESTIC ADVANTAGE (Eurasianet)

Mirza Khazar — Wed, 04 Jul 2007 12:53:00 -0400

Rovshan Ismayilov 7/03/07 As Azerbaijan’s military spending reaches $1 billion, the country’s leadership has revived rhetoric about using force to resolve the 19-year Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. But for all the war worries sparked by bellicose statements, experts in Baku stress that they have more to do with diplomatic maneuvering and domestic politics than an actual desire to trade talks for tanks. Over the past month, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly indicated that Baku’s patience with years of start-and-stop negotiations is running thin. The last such encounter, a June 10 tête - à - tête with Armenian President Robert Kocharian in St. Petersburg, did nothing to move peace talks forward. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive]. News agencies have reported Aliyev as attributing the failure of the talks to "Armenia’s unconstructive and insincere position." Instead, a new tact is being taken – at least in words. "We are close to the liberation of Karabakh. We are powerful enough to liberate our lands," Aliyev said during a July 2 police academy graduation ceremony in Baku. "Azerbaijan is the [most] powerful country in the region," he went on to say, APA news agency reported. "No one wants a new war again, [but] Azerbaijan is prepared [for] any military operations any time. It would be better if Armenia understands it and pull[s] out the troops from our territories." Speaking at a Baku reception on June 25, Army Day, Defense Minister Safar Abiyev warned that if Armenia failed to do so, "[the] Azerbaijani Army will do it itself." In Armenia, many interpret these statements as a sign that Azerbaijan is ready to use force to regain control of the disputed region and seven bordering territories occupied by ethnic Armenian troops. Azerbaijan’s first National Security Concept, signed by Aliyev on May 24, emphasizes a need to improve the country’s defensive capabilities in order to better respond to separatism and regional conflicts. In Azerbaijan, however, some local observers contend that Aliyev’s remarks have less to do with a rumbling toward war, and more to do with a strategic game plan. The ability to outspend Armenia in an arms race is one of the few instruments that Baku could use to pressure Yerevan into making diplomatic concessions, specifically concerning Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, commented independent political analyst Rasim Musabekov. "And Aliyev is using this trump card vocally," he said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Much of Baku’s current military spending, made possible by booming energy revenues, is related to reforms to align the Azerbaijani military more closely with North Atlantic Treaty Organization standards by the end of 2007. Speaking on June 25, Defense Minister Abiyev detailed programs ranging from the modernization of naval vessels to the creation of a training school for army sergeants. Azerbaijan also plans to start manufacturing its own military materiel, with trial samples expected by the end of 2007. "[H]is statements mean that if somebody hopes that Azerbaijan will agree with the status quo that was imposed by force, they have to take into consideration current realities, too," said Musabekov, referring to Azerbaijan’s de facto loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to separatists and Armenian forces in 1994. "Azerbaijan has many more resources to build-up its military than does Armenia." One military expert, however, notes that the Azerbaijani build-up still does not give it a clear-cut superiority over Armenian forces. Hints about use of force have more to do with politics, commented Uzeir Jafarov. As occurred during the 2005 parliamentary election campaign, "[w]e will hear a lot of similar statements closer to the 2008 presidential elections," said Jafarov. No definitive signs exist that "would prove Azerbaijan is really preparing for war." Meanwhile, a "good cop-bad cop" scenario appears to be emerging. A so-called "coordinated" difference on Karabakh has long existed between Azerbaijan’s defense and foreign ministries. As the Defense Ministry talks about the military’s willingness to resolve the 19-year conflict by force, the Foreign Ministry insists on the need to continue talks with Armenia. A recent surprise mission to Armenia and Karabakh underlines that difference. Three days before Aliyev’s speech to police graduates, Azerbaijani Ambassador to Russia Polad Bulbuloglu co-headed a cultural delegation that traveled to Karabakh to meet with de facto President Arkady Ghukassian and to visit the town of Shushi, which holds strong cultural symbolism for ethnic Azeris. The one-day trip also included a meeting with Armenian President Robert Kocharian in Yerevan. Armenia’s ambassador to Russia, Armen Smbatian, was the other co-leader of the delegation. According to Ambassador Bulbuloglu, "more productive and long-lasting mutual visits between the two countries" are intended, the Azerbaijani news agency APA reported. Aliyev also met the delegation in Baku. Media outlets, however, have said little about his comments. The pro-government Trend news agency quoted Aliyev as telling the delegation that the Karabakh conflict "could only be solved on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and inviolability of borders, with granting a high level of self-governance to Nagorno-Karabakh." For now, at least officially, that language of diplomacy is the only one Yerevan maintains it can hear. According to local media reports, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian said at a July 2 press conference in Yerevan that "Ilham Aliyev rattles the saber for internal use." Editor’s Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in Baku. Posted July 3, 2007 © Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org

Azeri Radar Would Not Replace Czech Anti-Missile Site, U.S. Says

Mirza Khazar — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 02:13:00 -0400

15 June 2007 Azeri Radar Would Not Replace Czech Anti-Missile Site, U.S. Says NATO allies plan to assess missile defense systems by February 2008 By Vince Crawley USINFO Staff Writer Washington -- NATO's 26 nations have agreed to assess by February 2008 the political and military implications of planned missile- defense systems in Europe, and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said alliance members have voiced no criticism of the U.S. portion of the plan. Gates also told reporters June 14 that an Azerbaijan radar site, proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, would complement, not replace, an anti-missile radar system the United States is negotiating to build in the Czech Republic. Gates visited Brussels, Belgium, June 14-15 for a scheduled meeting of NATO defense ministers, as well as a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council. "I was very explicit in the meeting [of the NATO-Russia Council] that we saw the Azeri radar as an additional capability, that we intended to proceed with the radar, the X-band radar in the Czech Republic," Gates said. The United States is in talks with the Polish and Czech governments to host 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic to defend Europe and North America against intercontinental missiles launched from the Middle East. (See related article.) Russia has expressed concerns that the missile-defense system could upset the long-standing nuclear deterrence posture in Europe. But the United States says the proposed 10 interceptors are too few to be effective against Russia's numerous warheads. At the annual Group of Eight Summit in early June, Putin made a surprise offer of partnership with the U.S. and European missile defense system, proposing to share data from a Soviet-era air-defense radar system leased by Russia and located in Azerbaijan. Reaction to the proposal has been mixed in Azerbaijan, where some worry the radar site could be seen as too provocative for neighboring Iran. (See related article.) "I appreciated Putin's recognition of the potential missile threat from the Middle East and welcomed his proposal last week to share radar data from Azerbaijan," Gates told reporters. Throughout the Brussels meetings, Gates said he did not hear criticism by allies of U.S. anti-missile plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. "There were no criticisms by any of the NATO allies of our missile- system proposals or of our moving forward," Gates said. "There obviously is interest in trying to encourage the Russians to participate with us, to make the system complimentary to NATO short- range missile defenses." Gates said NATO and the United States would continue discussing how to make their missile-defense systems work together in a complimentary way. On June 14, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer released a statement saying the alliance will study the possibility of "bolting" NATO and U.S. missile-defense systems together to ensure that all 26 allies are protected effectively from future threats. De Hoop Scheffer said the allies plan to assess by February 2008 the effects of U.S. anti-missile plans in Europe and how these plans can be coordinated with NATO's own anti-missile plans. "In essence, the alliance will pursue a three-track approach," de Hoop Scheffer said in the statement. The three tracks include: continue the ongoing NATO project to develop by 2010 a theater missile-defense for protecting deployed troops; assess the full implications of the U.S. system; and continue existing cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense, as well as consultation on related issues. De Hoop Scheffer stressed that missile-defense issues are based on two key principles: the "indivisibility of security" and that there cannot be "A or B" NATO members in terms of protection from missile threats. A transcript of Gates' remarks to reporters after the Brussels meeting is available on the Defense Department Web site. The full text of a NATO statement on the Brussels meeting, as well as audio and video links to meeting events, is available on the NATO Web site. (USINFO is produced by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

AZERBAIJAN: BUILDING BRIDGES FOR PRESIDENT ALIYEV'S RE-ELECTION?

Mirza Khazar — Thu, 31 May 2007 07:34:03 -0400

Mina Muradova and Khazri Bakinsky: 5/30/07

An ambitious infrastructure upgrade campaign has taken Azerbaijan by storm in recent months, but some economists point to the 2008 presidential vote as the prime reason for the state-funded building boom and question the projects’ transparency.

Infrastructure projects will account for a staggering 87 percent of this year’s government investment programs, recently revised to total $2.2 billion (1.9 billion manats), according to Oktai Ahverdiyev, chief of the Cabinet of Ministers’ finance department.

Under this plan, by the end of 2007, Azerbaijan will have five new airports – some in the remotest parts of the country. Aside from existing international airports in the western town of Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second largest metropolitan area, and the exclave of Nakhchivan (bordering Armenia and Iran), an international airport is planned for the southern town of Lenkoran, close to the Iranian border. Airports in Sheki, a popular tourist destination in northern Azerbaijan, and Zaqatala, a small nearby town, will handle smaller planes. The cost for these facilities has not been made public.

Extensive highway and bridge projects are also in the works. In 2007, the government plans to spend $500 million on the construction and repair of highways – a figure that is 80 percent higher than 2006 expenditures, APA news agency reported, citing the Ministry of Transportation. Ten new bridges and 18 underpasses are planned for Baku to lessen the city’s growing traffic congestion. In addition, repairs will be carried out on 40 bridges between Baku and the Russian border, and a new highway will be built from the Azerbaijani capital to the Iranian border.

At an opening ceremony for one of Baku’s new bridges in March, President Aliyev declared that the bridge building shows Azerbaijan’s economic muscle. “It means that we are becoming strong,” media outlets reported him as stating. The 200 million manat ($232 million) allocated for the bridges and underpasses “will not be to make a profit,” he elaborated, stressing that “[a]ll of this is done for the people’s welfare.”

Senior government official Ahverdiyev has stated that “poverty reduction” will also be included in the campaign. Planned expenditures will target improvement of “the water supply, sanitation systems, education [system] and healthcare,” Aheverdiyev told Trend news agency recently.

Some questions, however, surround the details.

"Azerbaijan’s infrastructure needs to improve, but first it should be seriously studied to define priority highways and bridges [for work], which of them can really eliminate problems with traffic jams,” argued economist Azer Mehtiyev, deputy chairman of Baku’s non-governmental Center for Economic Research. Money for these improvements has so far been allocated without such a hit list, he added.

That leaves particular questions about the viability of the five new airports, observed Zohrab Ismaylov, head of the non-governmental Center for Market Economy Assistance in Baku. "I am not sure that airports in Zaqatala or Lenkoran can give a profit even in the mid-term future," Ismaylov said. Zaqatala has a population of around 26,000 people, according to official statistics. Lenkoran’s population stands at under 50,000. Both towns are in non-industrial areas with no emphasis on exports.

Both Mekhtiyev and Ismaylov, however, contend that the large-scale investment projects have as much to do with the 2008 presidential elections as they do with infrastructure improvements.

Decisions about the infrastructure projects “come suddenly during [Aliyev’s] trips to the regions and in meetings with residents,” observed the Center for Economic Research’s Mehtiyev. “There is no clear… policy."

Mehtiyev holds that the construction projects will be used to let Aliyev show that he has met a 2003 presidential campaign promise to create 600,000 new jobs by 2008. At an April 13 speech to government ministers, Aliyev reported that 535,000 jobs – the majority allegedly permanent and outside of Baku – have been set up during his time in office.

Public tenders for the projects have also not been held, a fact that has spurred concerns that money for the projects, derived from Azerbaijan’s sizeable oil income, is being misappropriated. Mehtiyev charges that companies “close to high-level officials” act as project contractors; Ismaylov of the Center for Market Economy Assistance claims that a recent 371 million manat (about $369 million) increase in state investments was approved by parliamentarians without detailed information about the funds’ intended use.

"From the point of view of efficiency and of transparency in spending oil revenues, the construction industry is not the best sphere," Ismaylov stressed. Many construction companies are unregistered and operate wtihout paying taxes, he noted.

One pro-opposition political analyst agreed. “[Information about] implementation of these projects is closed to the public,” charged Rasim Musabekov. “It is out of public control and gives the government an opportunity to misappropriate oil revenues.”

Government officials could not be reached for commentary.

But for President Aliyev, what matters is that signs of change are beginning to appear.

“New business have opened, roads are paved, neighborhoods improved and modernized,” the Azerbaijani leader told reporters in April. “The main goal is to reduce the gap [in living standards] between urban and rural population centers. And we can achieve this.”

Editor’s Note: Mina Muradova and Khazri Bakinsky are freelance reporters in Baku.

(www.eurasianet.org)

Eurasianet: AZERBAIJAN TOPS THE CHARTS FOR NUMBER OF IMPRISONED JOURNALISTS

Mirza Khazar — Tue, 22 May 2007 19:37:37 -0400

5/22/07

The number of Azerbaijani journalists in prison has reached a record high over the past month, even while one senior government official maintains that the country’s leadership is doing everything possible to respect press freedom.

Azerbaijan currently has the highest number of arrested journalists among all of the 56 member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Miklos Haraszti, the organization’s special representative for media freedoms, told Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in April. As if to underscore that status, the Paris-based media rights watchdog Reporters Without Borders recently included the Azerbaijani leader on its list of so-called “Media Predators.”

Since then, the number of imprisoned journalists has risen from five to seven. Most recently, on May 16, opposition newspaper Muhalifat editor Rovshan Kebirli and correspondent Yashar Agazade were sentenced to two years and six months in prison for allegedly slandering the president’s uncle, Jalal Aliyev. The correspondent had described Jalal Aliyev as “the most corrupt person in Azerbaijan” with control of the country’s largest trading center, AMAY. Aliyev demanded evidence for the charges, which the newspaper did not provide.

International human rights and media watchdog organizations, the United States, and the European Union have repeatedly urged the Azerbaijani government to release all imprisoned journalists and to adopt legislation that would ban the criminal prosecution of media representatives.

Government officials assert that criticism of their stance on media rights is off-target. In remarks to journalists on May 3, Ali Hasanov, head of the presidential administration’s political department, asserted that “[a]fter Ilham Aliyev took office [in 2003], he solved all problems with media freedom.”

“A few facts related to some journalists cannot be equated with the situation in the country as a whole,” Hasanov added. Imprisoned journalists, however, were excluded from a May 8 parliament amnesty for prisoners granted at the suggestion of the president’s wife, parliamentarian Mehriban Aliyeva.

Reporters Without Borders appears to be in the presidential administration’s firing line. Hasanov claimed that the organization “is working under the Armenian lobby’s influence,” and has been “fighting against [Azerbaijani ally] Turkey for a long time.” Given this perceived bias, officials in Baku tend to disregard the group’s assessments.

The criticism of international organizations is unlikely to die down soon. Late on May 20, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, citing violation of fire safety standards, moved to shut down the offices of Realniy Azerbaijan and Gundelik Azerbaijan, two newspapers often critical of the Aliyev administration. The papers’ publisher and editor-in-chief, Eynulla Fatullayev, was recently sentenced to two-plus years in prison for slander. Intervention by local journalists, human rights activists and American and British diplomats stopped the closure, the pro-opposition news agency Turan reported

A rally by local journalists has been tentatively scheduled for June 14 in Baku to protest the recent imprisonments of reporters.

Perhaps the highest profile instance of press repression involves Fatullayev, who was arrested on April 20 on charges of slandering internally displaced persons from Khojali, a town in Nagorno-Karabakh. The suit was filed by Tatiana Chaladze, chairwoman of the Committee for Protection of Refugees, a Baku-based non-governmental organization. In an article entitled “Karabakh Diary,” Fatullayev published a statement by an Armenian army officer who said that Armenian forces had kept open an exit corridor for civilians during a bloodbath in 1992, remembered in Azerbaijan as the Khojali massacre. The article also reported that escapees from Khojali confirmed the existence of such a corridor. Chaladze demanded evidence that the town’s former residents had confirmed the existence of a corridor. Fatullayev was also charged for reportedly stating in an online discussion forum that chaotic Azerbaijani gunfire had killed some Khojali residents. The publisher maintains that both accusations are a political response to Realniy Azerbaijan’s sharp criticism of President Aliyev’s rule.

Helping to stir the press freedom controversy was a brutal beating of the editor of Gundelik Azerbaijan on the day of Fatullayev’s sentencing. The editor, Uzeir Jafarov, was hospitalized as a result of injuries suffered in the attack. He claims that a police officer who attended Fatullayev’s trial was among his assailants. The charge has not yet been investigated. The arrest of Sanat newspaper reporter Rafik Taghi and editor Samir Sadagtogulu focused on a similarly sensitive topic, the role of Islam. On May 4, the two received three and four-year prison sentences respectively, for the publication of a 2006 article that described Christian values as more progressive than Islamic values. Charges were brought by the general prosecutor’s office for “inflaming religious conflict.” [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Baku analysts have trouble explaining possible reasons for the government’s apparent hard line toward journalists. The country’s opposition is weak and fragmented, they note, and the presidential elections are still a year off.

The April 27 decision to grant a broadcast license to private television and radio company ANS after months of delay is cited by Azerbaijani reporters as the only recent sign of tolerance of media outlets that diverge from the government’s viewpoint. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Shahin Hajiyev, editor of the pro-opposition Turan news agency, which has had its own property dispute tussle with officials, sees the issue as part of a larger malaise concerning democratization. “It is not only a media problem, “commented Hajiyev. “It is a problem with the general situation with democracy in Azerbaijan.”

Editor’s Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in Baku.

(www.eurasianet.org)

Freedom House: 2006 Countr Report, Azerbaycan is "not free"

Mirza Khazar — Tue, 01 May 2007 23:47:59 -0400

Flawed parliamentary elections in November 2005 capped a year of unfulfilled reform ambitions in Azerbaijan. The elections resulted in the opposition's securing only a small fraction of the 125 seats in the Milli Majlis (National Assembly), with a substantial majority going to the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) and its allies. The run-up to the election included claims by the regime of an attempted coup, which resulted in the detention and arrest of several former ministers.

After having been controlled by the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century, Azerbaijan enjoyed a brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920. It entered the Soviet Union in 1922 as part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Republic, becoming a separate Soviet republic in 1936. Following a referendum in 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence from the disintegrating Soviet Union.

In 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the nationalist opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front, was elected president in a generally free and fair vote. A military coup one year later ousted him from power and installed the former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Heydar Aliyev, in his place. In the October 1993 presidential elections, Aliyev was credited with receiving nearly 99 percent of the vote. Azerbaijan's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections, held in November 1995, saw five leading opposition parties and some 600 independent candidates barred from the vote in which Aliyev's Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) won the most seats. In October 1998, Aliyev was chosen president with more than 70 percent of the vote in an election marred by irregularities.

In November 2000, the ruling YAP captured the majority of seats in the parliamentary election. The Azerbaijan Popular Front and the Communist Party came in a distant second and third, respectively. International monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe cited widespread electoral fraud, including the stuffing of ballot boxes and a strong pro-gov-ernment bias in state-run media. Despite widespread criticism of the elections, the Council of Europe approved Azerbaijan's application for membership just days after the vote, a decision widely criticized by international human rights groups.

An August 2002 national referendum led to the adoption of a series of constitutional amendments, some of which critics charged would further strengthen the ruling party's grip on power. One controversial amendment stipulated that the prime minister become president if the head of state resigns or is incapacitated. Critics charged that the aging and ailing Aliyev would appoint his son, Ilham, prime minister in order to facilitate a transfer of power within the Aliyev family. Opposition groups and the OSCE charged that the referendum was marred by fraud, including ballot-box stuffing, intimidation of election monitors and officials, and inflated voter-turn-out figures of nearly 90 percent.

In the months preceding the October 2003 presidential election, the political environment was marked by uncertainty over Heydar Aliyev's declining health and its implications for his reelection bid. Aliyev collapsed during a live television broadcast in April and left Azerbaijan that summer to receive medical treatment abroad. At the same time, government officials continued to deny that his health problems were serious, and he remained the official YAP candidate for the presidential election. In June, Aliyev's son, Ilham, was officially nominated as a presidential candidate, and the elder Aliev withdrew his candidacy in favor of his son's on October 2, 2003.

In the 2003 presidential ballot, final election results released by the Central Election Commission showed Ilham Aliyev defeating seven challengers with nearly 77 percent of the vote. His closest rival, opposition Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar received only 14 percent of the vote, while six other candidates received less than 4 percent each. According to OSCE observers, the election was marred by widespread fraud. During violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators in Baku in October, in which at least one person was reportedly killed and several hundred were injured, the authorities unleashed a crackdown against the opposition in which more than 600 people were detained. Among those arrested were opposition party leaders and supporters who had not been directly involved in the preceding days' violence, along with many election officials who refused to certify fraudulent election results. Heydar Aliyev, who had long dominated the country's political life, died in December 2003.

Over the course of 2004 and 2005, Ilham Aliyev sought to consolidate his position among the country's ruling elite. In the immediate run-up to the November 2005 parliamentary election, a number of former and current senior officials were detained in response to what the regime claimed was a coup attempt. However, observers maintained that the detentions were a move on the president's part to further consolidate control over the country's political elites.

Less than half of all registered voters cast ballots in the legislative poll, the lowest voter turnout in a decade. More than 2,000 candidates registered for the 125 constituencies. However, about a fourth of these candidates ultimately withdrew, in some cases because of intimidation, leaving 1,550 to take part on election day. The elections resulted in the opposition's capturing 10 of 125 seats in the Milli Majlis (National Assembly), with a substantial majority going to the ruling YAP and its allies. Seats in four districts were invalidated by the authorities and were scheduled to be rerun after the end date of the coverage period of this report. The results of the elections were contested by the opposition, which organized a number of rallies in the country's capital.

A settlement for the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in the early 1990s, was not achieved, although high-level talks provided a glimmer of hope that a process could be in the works to ameliorate the tense state of affairs. The region, which is formally part of Azerbaijan, is now predominantly ethnically Armenian and effectively under Armenian control.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Citizens of Azerbaijan cannot change their government democratically. The country's constitution provides for a strong presidency and the country's parliament, the 125 member Milli Majlis, exercises little independence from the executive branch. Presidential and parliamentary terms are five years.

The 1993, 1998, and 2003 presidential and 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections were considered neither free nor fair by international observers. The 2005 parliamentary elections were likewise afflicted by extensive irregularities. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights cited among the elections' shortcomings "interference of local authorities, disproportionate use of force to thwart rallies, arbitrary detentions, restrictive interpretations of campaign provisions and an unbalanced composition of election commissions." President Ilham Aliev issued two decrees, in May and October 2005, directing the administration of free and fair elections; these decrees effectively went unheeded.

Corruption is deeply entrenched throughout society, with government officials rarely held accountable for engaging in corrupt practices. The lack of judicial and parliamentary independence from the executive, among other institutional obstacles, creates an environment that enables corruption. Azerbaijan was ranked 137 out of 159 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index.

While Azerbaijan's constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press, the authorities use a variety of tools to intimidate the press. Journalists are subject to physical harassment and even risk death. In March 2005, Elmar Huseinov, editor of the opposition magazine Monitor, was shot to death in the lobby of his apartment building in Baku. The broadcast media are the main source of information in the country. Of the 16 television stations, 4 broadcast to a national audience; all 4 of these have clear or likely links to the regime. Independent and opposition papers struggle financially in the face of low circulation, limited advertising revenues, and heavy fines or imprisonment of their staff. State businesses rarely if ever advertise in opposition newspapers. While there is some pluralism in the print media, it is irrelevant to the extent that newspapers have relatively low print runs, are not distributed regularly in rural areas, and are frequently too expensive for many people to purchase on a regular basis.

A noteworthy development in 2005 was the unveiling of Azerbaijan's first public service broadcasting channel, which began operations in August. Following the flawed presidential election in 2003, the Council of Europe, of which Azerbaijan is a member, adopted a resolution demanding that the government of Azerbaijan immediately implement a series of measures that included the creation of public service television to allow political parties to better communicate with the country's citizens. The Council of Europe for months exhorted the authorities in Baku to establish a genuinely independent public broadcasting channel, but the regime was slow in implementing the directive. The channel's creation just weeks in advance of the November 2005 election minimized its impact on the election process. The opposition was afforded some television airtime during the election campaign, but overall news coverage was slanted toward the ruling YAP and its candidates.

The government restricts some religious activities of members of "nontraditional" minority religious groups through burdensome registration requirements and interference in the importation and distribution of printed religious materials. Islam, Russian Orthodoxy, and Judaism are considered traditional religions, and their members can generally worship freely.

The government generally does not restrict academic freedom. However, some faculty and students have experienced political pressure. After the October 2003 election and in advance of the 2005 parliamentary poll, some professors and teachers said they were dismissed because of their membership in opposition parties.

The government often restricts freedom of assembly, especially for political parties critical of the government. Registration with the Ministry of Justice is required for a nongovernmental organization (NGO) to function as a legal entity, and the registration process has been described as cumbersome and nontransparent. A week before the 2005 parliamentary elections, Azerbaijan lifted a ban on NGOs receiving more than 30 percent of their funding from foreign sources to serve as election monitors. Although the law permits the formation of trade unions and the right to strike, the majority of trade unions remain closely affiliated with the government and most major industries are state owned.

The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and subservient to the executive branch. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, particularly for members of the political opposition. Detainees are often held for long periods before trial, and their access to lawyers is restricted. Police abuse of suspects during arrest and interrogation reportedly remains commonplace, with torture sometimes used to extract confessions. Prison conditions are reportedly severe, with many inmates suffering from overcrowding and inadequate medical care.

Some members of ethnic minority groups, including the small Armenian population, have complained of discrimination in areas including education, employment, and housing. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris who fled the war in Nagorno-Karabakh have been prevented by the Armenian government from returning to their homes and remain in Azerbaijan, often living in dreadful conditions.

Significant parts of the economy are in the hands of a corrupt elite, which severely limits equality of opportunity. Supporters of the political opposition face job discrimination, demotion, or dismissal.

Traditional societal norms and poor economic conditions restrict women's professional roles. Domestic violence is a problem, and there are no laws regarding spousal abuse. In 2004, Azerbaijan adopted a new national program to combat human trafficking. According to the U.S. State Department's annual 2005 report on human trafficking, Azerbaijan is both a country of origin and a transit point for the trafficking of women for prostitution.

(www.freedomhouse.org)

AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT PRESSES GENERATIONAL CHANGE WITHIN GOVERNING PARTY

Mirza Khazar — Wed, 11 Apr 2007 04:36:02 -0400

Eurasia Insight:
AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT PRESSES GENERATIONAL CHANGE WITHIN GOVERNING PARTY
Rovshan Ismayilov: 4/10/07

A series of startling developments concerning Azerbaijan’s governing party indicate that President Ilham Aliyev is solidifying his hold over the South Caucasus country’s government.

The first sign that all was not calm within the governing Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) came on March 15, when Sirus Tebrizli, a founding member of YAP and its deputy chairman, made highly charged public comments, in which he called for the exposure of “traitors in the ruling party.”

“These people [traitors] had always surrounded [former president] Heidar Aliyev and now they keep providing Ilham Aliyev with false information about the situation in Azerbaijan,” Tebrizli said. He even named the head of the presidential administration, Ramiz Mekhdiyev, as the “leader of the traitors’ group.” The outburst prompted an emergency session of YAP’s Political Council on March 27, during which Tebrizli was expelled from the party for violating party rules, according to a report distributed by the APA news agency.

On March 16, a fight erupted in parliament after MP Husein Abdullayev, who ostensibly was a pro-government legislator, began vehemently denouncing the government’s performance. When Abdullayev refused to heed the parliament speaker’s command to be silent, another MP, Fazail Agamli, acted to physically restrain the renegade legislator. Abdullayev, who is reputedly one of the richest oligarchs in Azerbaijan, promptly sent Agamli sprawling. Three days later, Abdullayev was arrested and stripped of his parliamentary immunity.

Meanwhile, President Aliyev’s image has taken a hit during the ongoing trial of Ali Insanov, a former health minister and founder of the YAP who was arrested on corruption charges in 2005 shortly before the country’s parliamentary elections. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Throughout the trial, Insanov has accused Aliyev of wrong-doing. Making a closing statement on April 10, Insanov claimed that Ilham Aliyev had “abducted power,” adding that the younger Aliyev had been improperly appointed prime minister, putting him in line to succeed his father, Heidar, who was comatose at the time and could not sign the appropriate executive order. Insanov also hinted that the incumbent president was corrupt, and used illicit earnings to purchase a vacation home in Miami, the Russian news agency Regnum reported. A top YAP official and Aliyev loyalist, Ali Ahmedov, dismissed Insanov’s accusation as “gibberish,” the Turan news agency reported.

A March 25 report in the opposition newspaper Yeni Musavat claimed that Jalal Aliyev -- the president’s uncle and an arch-conservative MP -- wanted to split with YAP and establish his own political party. The new party, Yeni Musavat speculated, would attract members of the governing elite who have grown disenchanted with President Aliyev’s leadership style, including Tebrizli, Abdullayev and others. Jalal Aliyev, in March 28 comments distributed by the Turan news agency, vigorously denied the Yeni Musavat report as “absolutely groundless.”

Some independent political analysts suggest that recent developments are part of a plan, implemented by the president, to replace the governing party’s old guard with younger officials whose policy views are more in line with his own. Alesker Mammadli, a political expert and lawyer, suggested that, after three-plus years at the helm in Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev has consolidated power to a sufficient degree that he now feels he can push his father’s loyalists from power.

“People like Tebrizli, Insanov or Abdullayev were confident that the president needed them. However, Ilham Aliyev does not want such dependency, and is substituting them with the people personally devoted to him,” Mammadli said.

A commentary distributed March 31 by the Today.az website attributed the latest events to “nothing more than a generational shift within the ruling party.”

“Those who expected radical cadre changes from President Ilham Aliyev upon his election to the presidency in 2003 were disappointed with the slow pace of reforms,” the commentary continued. “President Aliyev let the passage of time, and a regular political process in the country, shape his cadre policy.”

Mammadli indicated that it was unlikely that Ilham Aliyev’s would face serious opposition from within the ruling elite in the near future, explaining that all of the president’s most dangerous potential rivals for power had been removed, including Insanov, Abdullayev and former economic development minister Farhad Aliyev, who was arrested in 2005 on treason charges. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. “[Former president] Heidar Aliyev never had bright and strong personalities in his team and these people are not able to become serious political leaders in Azerbaijan now,” Mammadli said. “The most dangerous ones -- Farhad Aliyev, Ali Insanov and Husein Abdullayev -- are imprisoned. The majority of others, while having lost political power, will do their best to keep at least their freedom and their capital.”

Ilgar Mammadov, an independent Baku-based political analyst, believes that even if a schism occurred within the YAP, the anti-presidential faction would be hard-pressed to attract enough support so that it could mount a serious challenge to Aliyev’s authority. “The only person who has ‘YAP roots’ but who theoretically could become an ‘agent of change’ is Farhad Aliyev. But he is in prison,” Mammadov said.

Editor’s Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance reporter based in Baku.

(www.eurasianet.org)

Global Research: Azerbaijan and the US Sponsored War on Iran

Mirza Khazar — Tue, 10 Apr 2007 10:11:56 -0400

Azerbaijan and the US Sponsored War on Iran

By Prof. Michel Chossudovsky

Global Research, April 9, 2007

In a timely decision, Azerbaijan recently granted NATO the permission to use two of its military bases and an airport to "back up its peace-keeping operation in Afghanistan" including support for NATO's "supply route to Afghanistan". NATO's special envoy Robert Simmons insists that the agreement has nothing to do with US plans to wage aerial bombardments on Iran.

Media sources in Baku have intimated that this timely agreement is directly related to ongoing US-Israeli-NATO war plans. Its timing coincides with US naval deployments and war games in the Persian Gulf.

The airport and two military bases are slated to be "modernized to meet NATO standards". Washington has confirmed in this regard that it would "support the modernization of a military airport in the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) signed between Azerbaijan and NATO.

Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan released a statement to the effect that "Azerbaijan's territory will not be at the disposal of any country for hostile acts against neighbours [Iran] " (See Mardom Salari (Farsi), BBC translation, 5 April 2007).

This announcement by the Azeri Defense Ministry was in response to an off-the-cuff statement by US Undersecretary of State Matthew Bryza, at a press conference in Georgia (March 30) to the effect that "The United States hopes for permission to use airfields in Azerbaijan for military purposes."

"A lot of planes overfly Georgia and Azerbaijan on the way to Afghanistan. Should it prove necessary, we would like to be able to use an airfield in Azerbaijan," the US diplomat said, answering a question concerning the modernization of a military airfield in Azerbaijan with the Americans' help. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 2, 2007)

Maj. Eric Lehman, GSSOP Task Force commander (Left), briefs Mr. Matthew Bryza, deputy
assistant secretary of state for Eurasian affairs(Center) and Ambassador Richard Miles (Right)
during convoy ambush training July 29th 2006 at Krtsanisi National Training Center about
25 kilometers south of Tbilisi, Georgia

According to Azerbaijani political scientist, Zardusht Alizade, the NATO/US military agreement with the Baku government pertains to several Azeri airfields, which could be used to receive and service US/NATO aircraft:

"Baku may also help the United States with data on ballistic missile defense'... Moreover, the words of the Azerbaijani authorities do not always match their deeds, and the statement of the Defense Ministry may be anything but the last word on the subject. "If the US Administration appeals to Aliyev and the latter summons the courage to turn the request down, all the better for him," Alizade said. "I do not really think that he will want to peeve Washington." According to the political scientist, the consequences of this step may be quite dire. Tehran has already proclaimed its readiness to strike at strategic objects nearby which are important for the United States. "Iranian capacities are not to be underestimated. A single division of its armed forces can occupy all of Azerbaijan without a second thought. I only hope that this is some sort of political game and that the United States does not really intend to strike at Iran," Alizade said" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 2, 2007)

Strategic Caspian Sea Maritime Border with Iran

Azerbaijan is also strategic in view of its maritime border with Iran in the Caspian sea. In this regard, the U.S. Navy is involved in supporting the Azeri Navy, in the area of training. There is also an agreement to provide US support to refurbish Azeri warships in the Caspian sea.

The US sponsored Caspian Guard Initiative was launched in 2003 to "coordinate activities in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with those of U.S. Central Command and other U.S government agencies to enhance Caspian security." The initiative was implemented under the cover of preventing narcotics trafficking and counter- terrorism, It ultimate objective, however, is to provide USCENTCOM with a strategic naval corridor in the Caspian sea basin.

The US has also participated in joint Naval exercises with the Azeri Army’s 641st Special Warfare Naval Unit, headquartered at the Azeri Naval Station outside Baku.

More generally, both the US and NATO are in the process of deepening their military cooperation with Azerbaijan. In recent developments, military-political consultations between the US and Azerbaijan are scheduled to be held in Washington in the second half of April, according to a US Embassy source in Baku. (APA News, 4 April 2007)

"the consultations will cover issues on strategic cooperation, Azerbaijan-NATO relations, the mutual activity of both countries in Iraq and Afghanistan and some other issues.[Iran] (ibid)

The timing of these consultations is crucial. They coincide chronologically with a process of advanced military planning.

Azerbaijan could be the object of retaliatory strikes by Iran, if the country's military bases are used by NATO-US forces as a launch pad for waging war on Iran.

Media sources in Baku have suggested that retaliatory bombings by Iran could include Azeri oil fields and oil and gas pipelines. The strategic Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which links the Caspian Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean could also be a target. The Baku Ceyan pipeline is controlled by an Anglo-American consortium led by British Petroleum (BP).

In early April, Iran deployed troops and military hardware along the Iranian-Azerbaijani border. According to an April 4 report of the Azerbaijani news agency Turan:

"Military experts think that the deployment of troops and hardware pursue defence ends. This means that the troops are being pushed forward to repel attacks... .... The start of an information [propaganda] war is obvious. An intelligence expert has told Turan that recent publications in the media saying that Iran has drawn up a list of facilities in Azerbaijan that will be bombed in case of a US attack [on Iran] are a glaring example of this. Most likely, the reports were prepared and passed to the mass media by the Iranian secret services to exert psychological pressure on Baku. The goal is to deter Baku from supporting Washington in a military conflict with Tehran. (Turan, 4 April 2007)

The Iran War Theater's "Northern Front"

US and allied naval deployments are concentrated in the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. The March NATO/US agreement with Baku, while building upon previous military cooperation agreements, specifically reinforces what might be described a "Northern Front" whereby Azeri military bases including airfields and naval facilities in the Caspian sea would be used by NATO and US forces in the case of US sponsored attacks on Iran.

If this were to occur, several Central Asian countries could be drawn into the conflict, leading to a process of military escalation. The latter could also extend into a ground war in which Iran would target US, British and NATO facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(www.globalresearch.ca)