The Voice of Mirza Xazar: Category Comments & Analyses

Mirza Khazar: The Yasamal Court Decision & The OSCE Reaction

Mirza Khazar — Thu, 19 Jul 2007 12:14:00 -0400

The OSCE Baku Office has made us happy by issuing such a positive and extremely optimistic Press Release. Best regards. The Yasamal District Court's revolutionary decision has made all of us happy. We have to be proud. The Yasamal decision was made when Azerbaijani journalists, including those still suffering in jails, celebrated 40th birthday of Elmar Huseynov. The "Azadlyq" case is an occasion. The government of Azerbaijan is under increased international pressure for persecuting independent media. The "Azadlyq" case is an occasion. It is an occasion to demonstrate how rule of law gaining position in Azerbaijan. It is an occasion to show that there are independent courts in Azerbaijan. A PR? Almost a PR. But it is not improtant. Important is that ... "If the use of the European Court of Human Rights case law becomes generalized in Azerbaijan's courts..." we will celebrate great improvement in the situation of freedom of the media in Azerbaijan, as the Press Release stated...If. Let us hope. Mirza Khazar

Eurasianet: FROM ABROAD, AZERBAIJANI TV STATIONS TRY TO SPEAK OUT

Mirza Khazar — Thu, 28 Dec 2006 02:14:54 -0500

As concerns continue about the Azerbaijani government’s tolerance for media criticism, a series of independent television stations have attempted to set up broadcast operations outside Azerbaijani borders. Some local observers contend that the recent decision to revoke and then to reinstate the broadcast license for independent television and radio company ANS, as well as the eviction of pro-opposition media outlets from their Baku offices, means that independent media cannot operate securely in Azerbaijan. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The government has strongly denied these charges, saying that the opposition has “politicized” both the evictions and the license dispute. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

But the denials have done little to calm jitters among media not associated with the government. Instead, many journalists, non-governmental organization and opposition members are focusing on operations beyond the control of the Azerbaijani regulatory authorities.

So far, however, a variety of bureaucratic, financial and political obstacles have prevented most of these stations, which rely on satellite links to broadcast to Azerbaijan, from making a huge impact.

To date, Gunaz TV, based in Chicago, is the closest any of these operations have come to being a success story. The satellite television station, started in April 2005 by Chicago businessman Ahmad Obali, an ethnic Azeri from Iran, focuses mostly on human rights issues in Iran; start-up capital came from donations by human rights activists and Iranian Azerbaijanis living in the US and Canada.

The operation runs on a shoestring budget of roughly $400,000 per year. Obali himself, a film school graduate, acts as technician, anchor and commentator. Volunteers provide much of the additional work. Obali denies what he claims are Iranian propaganda reports that the station is funded by the United States Department of State.

The programs are highly critical of the Iranian government and outspoken about discrimination against non-Iranian ethnic groups in Iran. Gunaz TV owner Obali says the broadcasts are meant to serve as a voice for an audience whose interests are not served by other broadcasters, [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

“The US government funds TV and radio channels in Persian that do not address the human rights issues related to minority rights,” Obali said. “They ignore cases of Azerbaijani political prisoners and never provide news related to the biggest community in Iran. We have to take care of ourselves.”

Canada-based human rights activist Fakhteh Zamani, a frequent Gunaz TV guest, claims that “a number of people” in Iran have been arrested for watching the station’s satellite broadcasts or telephoning the station during call-in programs.

Yet despite an Iranian ban on privately owned satellite dishes, Obali says that the station receives phone calls “from almost every city where Azerbaijanis live,” including Tehran, Tabriz, Zenjan, Ardebil, Urmiye, Sarab and Mishkin.

The reported arrests of callers, however, have prompted the station to have calls from Iran directed first to Europe before going to the US, Obali said.

The station affirms, however, that it stops short of targeting the Azerbaijani government in Baku. “We don’t want to be involved in politics in northern Azerbaijan,” Obali said. “We have to take care of ourselves.”

Not so with one other station, Azadlig TV (Freedom TV), a pro-opposition station which broadcasts from Germany to Azerbaijan. Station representatives would not disclose Azadlig TV’s ownership structure or sources of financing. Azerbaijani media, however, have claimed that the station belongs to Rasul Guliyev, the head of the opposition Democratic Party of Azerbaijan now living in political asylum in the United States.

During Azadliq TV’s brief broadcast life – from September to October 2005, amidst Azerbaijan’s parliamentary election campaign -- the station was highly critical of the Azerbaijani government, a fact that station representatives claim led to the cut-off of their satellite link by Turksat, Turkey’s state-owned satellite operator which provides services to many Azerbaijani homes. Azadlig’s signal was finally cut in the middle of a program featuring opposition leaders Musavat Party Chairman Isa Gambar and Democratic Party of Azerbaijan Chairman Guliyev, who the Azerbaijani government later accused of plotting a coup against President Ilham Aliyev. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The host of that program, Mirza Khazar, a former head of Radio Liberty’s Azerbaijani service and one of Azerbaijan’s most prominent radio personalities, claims that the Azerbaijani government is to blame for Azadlig TV going off the air. “[It was] probably due to political pressure by the Azerbaijani government on Turksat,” he commented.

Chicago-based Gunaz TV makes similar claims, saying that Turksat stopped their station’s broadcast after the Iranian government brought pressure to bear. The broadcaster now relies on American satellite service Telestar, and also uses web broadcasts.

TurkSat could not be reached for comment.

The Internet has also proven a more reliable medium for Khazar, whose earlier attempts to open a radio channel and newspaper in Azerbaijan both failed. The radio journalist, now living in Germany, claims that he was warned by individuals in the Azerbaijani government to give up these efforts. Instead, he now runs a web-based radio project called “mirzexezerinsesi.net” (Voice of Mirza Khazar), which provides a 90-minute pre-recorded radio program daily.

One of the better known attempts to start an independent satellite broadcast occurred in 2005, on the eve of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary campaign. Yeni TV, the brainchild of a group of media professionals, lawyers and non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders, however, failed to secure the necessary $1.5 million per year in funding estimated needed for satellite broadcasting from Prague to Azerbaijan. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Eldar Namazov, an opposition leader and head of the For Azerbaijan public forum, says that the group is now eager to resume work on the project. “All channels are under the government’s control,” Namazov commented. “The only channel which used to provide some alternative information, some diversity of views . . . was ANS. But now that ANS is under threat of being off the air every moment, they have to be careful in their broadcasts. So now there is no pluralism on the air,” Namazov said.

Yeni TV’s problems ran the gamut. After the Azerbaijani justice ministry refused to register the channel as a legal entity, the company was registered in Prague. Talks with Czech regulators about a broadcast license, however, led to nothing, Namazov said, after the channel’s founders became distracted by Azerbaijan’s 2005 parliamentary elections and failed to find adequate start-up capital.

The project’s inability to show that it could generate enough income to become a self-sustaining operation dissuaded international donors from investing in Yeni TV, noted Namazov. But Azerbaijan’s political landscape also played a role, he charged. “[International donors] also want to be sure that the broadcast will not be stopped due to political reasons one day, as has happened before with other channels,” he said.

Civil Society:
FROM ABROAD, AZERBAIJANI TV STATIONS TRY TO SPEAK OUT
Rovshan Ismayilov: 12/28/06

Editor’s Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in Baku

Mirza Khazar: Negative Assessment Of Azerbaijan's Economy (2001)

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:36:08 -0400

The United Nations Development Agency has released its annual report on economic development in Azerbaijan, which notes the nostalgia of most of the population for Soviet-era economic "stability." It is a strange assessment for a country with huge oil reserves and huge foreign investment in its oil industry. Despite years of heavy foreign investment in Azerbaijan's oil sector, according to the report, most people in Azerbaijan say they were better off when their country was part of the Soviet Union.
Foreign investment now accounts for about 70 percent of all foreign capital moving into Azerbaijan, up from less than 16 percent in 1994, the report said. Independent economists and opposition too have criticized the government policy of paying attention only to the oil industry, neglecting other sectors of country's economy, which in turn is the main reason for the closure of many enterprizes and the elimination of a huge number of jobs.
According to the UN report, aid from foreign governments is also a source of capital. But like many former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan is plagued by sluggish bureacracy and corruption that holds up investment, the UN report said. This assessment has been proven by cases of mismanagement of foreign humanitarian aid sent for Azerbaijani refugees. The UN assessment of the economic situation in Azerbaijan differs widely from Azerbaijani government statistics on economic development. For example, the annual UN study showed high unemployment of 69 percent among nearly a million refugees driven from the Armenian- occupied territories. The report does not mention overall unemployment among ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan, but according to an independent account, the percentage of people without jobs among non-refugees is also high. Furthermore due to the few jobs available in Azerbaijan, around 2 million Azerbaijanis were forced to leave their homeland to seek employment in Russia and other CIS states. Contrary to the Azerbaijani government's claims of economic "achievements" last year, the UN study ranked Azerbaijan 90th in standard of living among 173 countries from around the world.
(Mirza Khazar) 4 May 2001
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: A Fight Between Clans In Baku, Or A Sign Of Aliev's Weakness?

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:22:54 -0400

Recent commentaries and reports in the Azerbaijani press suggests that a real political struggle is underway between the so- called "clans" represented in upper echelons of power in Baku. The fight between those "clans" intensified last week when another group representing Western Azerbaijanis (Azerbaijanis from Armenia) created the new "Erivan Birliyi" (Erevan Unity) society. The founders of this new entity insist that their society has no political goals and pursues only "public goals." But in spite of this insistence, most political observers in Baku, as well as most commentators in the Azerbaijani press, believethat the main goal of the "Erivan Birliyi" is to become a sort of "center of power" in the event of Heydar Aliev's demise.
Both arguments seem to be sincere, but an attempt by Western Azerbaijanis to hold on their influence within the upper leadership in Baku suggests that after Aliev's departure they might fail to retain that influence or to maintain the grip on power in the long term. Local observers suggest that the haste in creating this "unity" is a clear sign of the weakness of the Western Azerbaijanis and suggests that they fear for their own future.
Another indication is that Western Azerbaijanis in the upper echelons of power are seriously preparing themselves for the power struggle which will erupt as soon as Aliev departs the political scene. But even if this is true, there are many obstacles restricting the ability of Western Azerbaijanis to actively play a role in the transition of power. One of the obstacles is, as the local press suggests, deep differencies and even hostility between "Erivan Birliyi" and another Western Azerbaijani society, called "Agridag" (the Turkish name for Mount Ararat).
Azerbaijani papers identify as the moving force behind "Erivan Birliyi" Ramiz Mehtiev, who heads the presidential staff. The main player in "Agridag" is Health Minister Ali Insanov. The rivalry between the two is no longer a secret in Baku.
There is another sign that the alleged power struggle will turn into struggle between "clans." According to some reports, the "Alindja" society which was formed in the early 1990's in Baku by elite groups from Nakhichevan, constitutes another influential group within the top leadership. Hostilities between these two "clans" have deepened since Aliev came to power in June 1993. The Nakhichevanis claim that they played a major role in bringing Aliev to power. They complain that despite having done so, they did not receive as much attention as the Western Azerbaijanis did.
One can not exclude the possibility that the rivalry between the Western Azerbaijanis and the Azerbaijanis from Nakhichevan will increase as rumors about President Aliev's health and his upcoming departure from power continue to spread. And as long as those rumors continue to spread, and as long as President Aliev's image on TV continues to worry his close allies, the fight between the "clans" will continue to intensify. As long as the struggle for power continues, it is likely to impact on other political forces and the public in Azerbaijan.
(Mirza Khazar - 22 May 2001 )

RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Aliev And The Fight For A Successor

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:19:23 -0400

There is no doubt that most of the recent commentaries that have appeared in opposition newspapers about Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev's health and his designs to have his son, Ilham, succeed him as president contain some exaggerated or at least partially biased ideas.
It is not surprising, since an attempt by a weak opposition to wage it's campaign against the 78-year-old president using propaganda might be considered a "natural" form of politics in Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt and too many indications that the fight to be Aliev's successor has begun in Azerbaijan. Rumors, reports, and commentaries on this subject are persistent. And Aliev's poor appearance on TV screens is too obvious to doubt that his health is not good -- contrary to what he and his son claim or what the official media tells the public. The Turkish TV Channel D, in a report on 26 April on the summit of Turkic-speaking countries, described the appearance of the Azerbaijani president in an unusually blatant manner: "Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev's gaunt appearance drew the attention of many people."
The remark is neither diplomatic nor polite, of course. But it might serve as an indicator of a new approach of in the Turkish media and perhaps the Turkish government towards Aliev. This fact is, of course, an external nuance of the fight to be Aliev's heir that is going on in Azerbaijan. It might have and might not have an impact on the battle for succession, since not Turkey, but maybe Russia and Iran also are interested to have their own "input" into this process. But there is no doubt that the main game is being played in Baku.
Aliev continues to show his determination to have Ilham succeed him as president. In his remarks at the Baku airport on 25 April before his flight to Ankara, Aliev praised Ilham's "great" speech in Strasbourg at a session of the Council of Europe. The Russian-language newspaper "Zerkalo," in a commentary on 26 April, showed confidence that the time has arrived for the anointed successor (Ilham) to appear in public. "The successor has been chosen and the only issue on agenda is to legitimize him," comments the paper.
It seems "Zerkalo" is right. The time is arriving. But there are a lot of problems and difficulties in getting a transition of power to occur at the right time. Aliev's decision to have his son be the next president angered and frightened many of his close allies within his own elite from the Nakhichevan "club." Judging from reports published in the local press, a fierce struggle to neutralize potential contenders -- Ramiz Mehtiev, the president's chief of staff, Ali Insanov, the health minister, and Kamaladdin Heidarov, head of the powerful state customs committee, are in the center of this ongoing infighting. According to some observers in Baku, Aliev's decision to tab his son as the heir apparent not only prompted a fight within the Nakhichevan "clan" for succession, but alienated most of his supporters among those people from Nakhichevan. Therefore, according to the same sources, even if Aliev succeeds to have his son appointed or elected as the next president, the new president will fail to have strong support among from not only the general public, but also from his own "kinsmen" from Nakhichevan.
This is considered to be the main weakness of Ilham. Therefore, a common question being asked in Baku in this regard is: How could Ilham Aliev survive in power without the support from his own "clan," which his father enjoyed for about 30 years? And the questions continue: Will Ilham be able to stay in power for a long time, as his father did? What can Azerbaijan expect from Ilham, if his father manages to bring him to power? How would the main outside players in the Caucasus -- Russia, the West, Iran, and Turkey react to such a power transition in Azerbaijan? And finally, will the opposition in Baku and some opposition leaders in exile actually accept this form of "natural" succession in Azerbaijan or not? These are the questions of the day. The answers will come and most likely rather soon.
(Mirza Khazar - 27 April 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Heydar Aliyev and Turkey (2001)

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:14:47 -0400

An attempt by several hundred supporters of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party to hold a protest demonstration in the center of Baku on 21 April was the first opposition protest action since the Karabakh war invalids were forced to stop a month-long hunger- strike in February. Police resorted to brute force to prevent the ADP supporters from holding an unauthorized rally to demand the release of political prisoners, but that does not detract from the implications of the action for the political situation in Azerbaijan.
Isa Gambar, head of the main opposition Musavat party, expressed support for the ADP's protest action in an interview published in the newspaper "Azadliq" on April 24. Gambar added that the Musavat party too is preparing for mass actions of protest. Azerbaijan Democratic Party chairman Rasul Quliev in his interview with "Hurriyyet" on April 24, suggested that consecutive protest rallies will force the present government to resign. One can interpret this suggestion as wishful thinking. But it would be a mistake either to overestimate the strength of the opposition, mainly its ability to unite or to underestimate President Heydar Aliev's ability to deal with such a development.
But we should not forget that the situation in which Heydar Aliev is forced to operate today is different from similar situations in the past. Heydar Aliev is now 78 and he is not physically fit. He is in the middle of crucial peace talks with Armenia, and it is not clear what he will sign and how the public and political parties in Azerbaijan will react. He did not manage to convince the main players in Caucasus to support his son, Ilham as his successor. His foreign policy towards Turkey, Iran, Russia and the West is not ideal at the moment. Tensions are mounting between Azerbaijan and Iran. Aliev's recent attempts to restore "fraternal" relations with Russia will demand from him and from Azerbaijan as a state a very high price. Aliev's attempt (in an effort to strengthen his own position) to play a very complicated and contradictory game between Russia and the United States, and his desire to win this game, does not seem to be a very sophisticated and successful policy.
Aliev's relations with Turkey are an obvious example of the failure of such a "twisted policy." Some observers believe that President Aliev is intentionally creating problems in relations with Turkey in order to gain Russian "kindness." This opinion might prove to be wrong or right. Heydar Aliev will leave for Ankara on April 25 to attend a summit of heads of states of Turkic speaking countries in Istanbul the following day. Not the summit as such, but relations between the Aliev leadership and Ankara will dominate his meetings with Turkish officials. Relations between two countries are at the worst point since Suleyman Demirel left office as President of Turkey a year ago. It is not only official Baku that is to blame for the worsening of relations with Ankara. The failure of the Turkish side to accept Turcophone countries as equal partners is also partly to blame for the present coolness in relations with Baku.
The Azerbaijani press is unanimous that Aliev will face tough questions in Ankara during his visit there. But it is possible that the Turkish side might also face such tough questions from Azerbaijani president. Aliev with his rich political experience managed to overcome all obstacles and survive in the past 30 years. Will he at this crucial moment of his career be able to overcome not only external pressures but the infighting expected to erupt within his immediate circle in the near future over who is best qualified to succeed him as president?
(Mirza Khazar - 24 April 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Low Expectations For Key West Peace Talks

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:09:15 -0400

Analysis and opinions published in the Azerbaijani press on the peace talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, Heidar Aliev and Robert Kocharian, respectively, suggest low expectations for the talks among observers, analysts, and even the general public in Baku on the outcome of meeting in Key West.
Observers in the Azerbaijani capital point out that the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE have failed to present new peace proposals to the sides in Florida. By presenting old and even contradictory proposals from 1997-1998, the OSCE co-chairmen admit that they do not have any fresh ideas on how to solve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Aliev's remarks at Key West on 3 April accusing the international community of not doing enough to end the conflict can be evaluated differently. It is possible that Aliev is securing himself a safe retreat in the case that the Key West talks fail. Therefore, according to some observers, one should not expect any real breakthrough in the Key West talks.
Who will emerge the "winner" in Florida is another question discussed among Azerbaijani politicians and observers. Most local commentators agree that since the Key West talks will not produce any concrete results in resolving the Karabakh conflict, the talks can help to keep the peace process alive. But on the other hand, Aliev, Kocharian, and maybe even U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell could all come out as symbolic winners. Aliev and Kocharian will show the public how tough they are in protecting and defending their national interests, and, in doing so, will make public relations gains back home in Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Furthermore, Aliev, according to local press comments, can easily continue his efforts to have his son become his successor, but could at the same time run into trouble at home if he fails to resolve the Karabakh conflict as the plight of several hundred thousand refugees is of great concern to the public. The peace negotiations could help the Azerbaijani government distract public attention from widespread corruption and even criticism from abroad, according to local observers. Many others believe that a peace deal would mean a continuation of the poverty and corruption that plagues Azerbaijani society. One winner might be U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who, according to some comments in the international media, will be able to show his skills as a proficient diplomat while gaining extensive and badly needed exposure by the international media. The possible winners are known. But who, if anyone, will be the losers? This question remains open in Baku. (Mirza Khazar)

10 April 2001
What Happened In Key West?

U.S. President George W. Bush's meeting with the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents on 9 April increased hopes for a peaceful solution of the Karabakh conflict in the near future. But the real outcome of the peace talks between Armenian President Robert Kocharian, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev and the three Minsk Group co-chairmen in Key West is still not clear.
Contradictory and deeply different reactions to the latest round of peace talks in Florida from Armenian and Azerbaijani officials have deepened uncertainty and doubts in Azerbaijan surrounding the Key West talks. Optimistic statements by Armenian government officials, and obviously cool reactions from Azerbaijani officials are still feeding this uncertainty. More and more politicians and ordinary citizens are asking how realistic the Armenian optimism is, and if there are indeed grounds for that optimism, then how should the Azerbaijani public understand the neutral and cool statements of officials close to prezident Aliev.
There are many different explanations expressed in Azerbaijani media following Key West talks. Some politicians claim the Azerbaijani president has made serious concessions to the Armenian side and has therefore chosen to remain silent on the outcome of peace talks. Other politicians express different views. They suggest that the excitement on the Armenian side could be an attempt to discredit the Azerbaijani leadership at home and to put more pressure on Heidar Aliev to agree to a peace accord promptly.
It is hard to support or reject any of these opinions. But the main question remains open - What happened in Key West? Is there any ground for Armenian optimism? Judging from Aliev's short and nervy statement in Washington after his meeting with the U.S. president, these questions are annoying the Azerbaijani leadership too. In his response to a reporter's question - How much of progress was made during the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh last week in Key West, Florida, Aliev responded with one sentence: " I haven't had the chance to measure how close we are now." This statement does not solve the problem. The main problem is: who will tell the Azerbaijani public what really happened in Key West? (Mirza Khazar) RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Iranian-Azerbaijani Tensions Persist (2001)

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 01:02:00 -0400

Relations between Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have become even more tense in recent days. According to the local press, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi has postponed his planned visit to Baku. At the same time, the press service of the Iranian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement reiterating Iranian claims on the status of Caspian Sea, as well as Iranian claims on parts of the sea regarded by official Baku as Azerbaijani territory.
At the same time, the press service has warned Western oil companies to stay away from disputed oilfields till the conflict is resolved. The issue was discussed at the CIS summit in Sochi last week. President Heidar Aliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to seek Russian support. According to initial reports, the Russian president proposed convening a meeting of four Caspian Sea states (Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan) to draw up a common policy on the status of Caspian Sea. But this report has proved to be unreal. In fact, Turkmenistan immediately reacted by saying that all five Caspian states should meet and decide on legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Moreover, Iranian National Security Council secretary Hassan Rouhani met with the new Russian ambassador to Iran, Aleksandr Maryasov, in Tehran on 6 August and made clear that Iran is not going to give up its initial position in this issue. "Any legal status of the Caspian Sea should be unanimously formulated by the five coastal states," said Rouhani during the meeting. The Russian diplomat in his turn pointed out that his country considers the 1921 and 1940 treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union as still valid.
There was no word if the two officials discussed the latest Iranian military actions in the Caspian sea. But from the Azerbaijani point of view the statements made during the meeting in Tehran have not clarified the situation, but rather complicated it. A report printed in the local newspaper "Ekho"on 7 August is also of great interest. According to the newspaper, the head of the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Hamid Reza Assefi, said at a press conference in Tehran that Iran is ready to defend its sector of the Caspian. He also said that Iran will have to take measures against foreign companies which decide to continue activities in the sector claimed by Iran.
It is obvious from the statements made in Baku and from the commentaries published in the local press that the Azerbaijani government is trying at least to win Russia's support for Baku's position. And it is obvious that President Aliev's desire to have Russia support Azerbaijan in its conflict with Iran has failed. Moreover, President Aliev's overture toward Moscow may mean first, that President Aliev is desperate to find outside support for his cause against Iran, and second, it also may mean that Western oil companies and the Western governments behind these companies are reluctant to show support for either side of the conflict, prefering to remain neutral and wait for the states involved to solve the issue.
A report in "The Turkish Daily News" of 8 August suggests that so far, only the Turkish government, or Turkish public is eager to help Baku in its conlifct with Iran. "The Turkish Daily News" printed an CNN-Turk interview with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In response to a question about a possible partnership between Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan against Iran, Russia and Armenia, Sharon stated that he would raise the issue of cooperating with Baku during his visit to Turkey. "I will say in Ankara that we are willing to enhance relations with Azerbaijan. But, I repeat that this relationship is not against any third country," Sharon said.
It is not clear if the idea of a partnership between Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan against Iran, Russia and Armenia is purely a journalistic hypothesis or official policcy in Ankara. But as far as it concerns Azerbaijan, this idea has been raised in the local press many times. Whether this idea reflects reality or not is another question.
(Mirza Khazar -7 August 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Aliev In Baku, Succession Issue At The Top Again (2001)

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 00:59:00 -0400

Judging from commentaries published in the Azerbaijani press after President Heidar Aliev's return to Baku on 14 April from his trip to the United States, it appears that the Azerbaijani press and political parties rather than Azerbaijan's leadership are again raising the old question: Who is going to be Aliev's successor? Since no one has a simple answer to this question, everyone is trying to do his best in guessing. Guessing is part of political life in Azerbaijan. And guessing is also an essential part of the life of ordinary people in Azerbaijan, since most Azerbaijanis are poor citizens of a country that is wallowing in corruption while proudly declaring itself an oil-rich democratic state. The subject of the "guess" here is obvious - the incompatability of oil riches and extreme poverty, the incompatability of an extremely rich tiny minority and the extreme poverty of the vast majority.
Azerbaijan has been under a cloud of "guesses" since Heydar Aliev came to power. Like ordinary citizens, every political party has its own guess in line with that party's desires and aspirations. Every political party has its own scenario which subsequently, in a thorough analysis, turns out to be the product of wishful thinking. Wishful thinking is also part of everyday life in Azerbaijan.
The circle of candidates to replace Heidar Aliev when he departs from power is narrowing. At present we have a circle with two personalities in it: Aliev's son Ilham and his chief of staff Ramiz Mehdiev, according to the local press. The opposition newspaper "Hurriyet," in a commentary published on April 17 and entitled "The successor will be Ramiz Mehdiev," follows the old pattern of guessing. But this guessing is not of a sort to be called wishful thinking. It has some essence in it, in that it comments on the latest events within Heidar Aliev's inner circle, especially the rise of Mehdiev.
That rise started during parliament elections last year and is still continuing. The newspaper claims that if Ramiz Mehdiev continues his political offensive, a conflict between him and Ilham Aliev is unavoidable. Is it true? One can only guess. Again, Azerbaijan is under cloud of guesswork: Heidar Aliev is firmly in power, newspapers are busy commenting on possible successors, and the opposition is waiting for "X" day (Aliev's departure from power) and keeping silence. When "X" day will be is, of course, not known. Aliev has no intention of ceding power. His son declared recently that Heidar Aliev will stay in power until the year 2007. So if Ilham Aliev is right, the guessing will continue in Azerbaijan at least for a while.
(Mirza Khazar - 17 April 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Mirza Khazar: Viktor Kozeny argues President Aliev Made Promises

Mirza Khazar — Sun, 24 Sep 2006 00:53:00 -0400

Viktor Kozeny, a Czech businessman who made millions of dollars from his country's voucher privatization program in the early 1990s, in an exclusive interview with the RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service, urged Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev to fulfill his promises made in 1997-1998 concerning the privatization program in his country. According to Kozeny, President Aliev and his son, Ilham, personally met with him and other members of Kozeny's investors group in Baku and encouraged them to buy vouchers from citizens.
Kozeny and his investors group intended to buy shares of the state oil company in course of privatization. The president's son, Ilham Aliev, is a vice president of the state oil company in Azerbaijan. "We have invested about $500 million in privatization checks in Azerbaijan," said Kozeny in his interview. But the Azerbaijani government decided in 1998 not to privatize the state oil company. Viktor Kozeny's $500 million worth of vouchers became worthless paper.
The U.S. investors have taken Kozeny to court, arguing that Kozeny deceived them about the risks of investing in Azerbaijan. Kozeny in turn claims that his partners, including former U.S. Senator George Mitchell and the U.S. insurance company AIG, knew of the risks of investing in Azerbaijan.
In an interview with RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service, Kozeny said that not only he but some of his other partners at the time met with President Aliev and received the same assurances that the privatization program would be implemented:
" Well, we (the president and I) discussed a variety of issues. These issues all centered around privatization -- and obviously it was of great concern to us that the privatization is going to go through and that a sufficient and valuable asset will be privatized in the foreseeable future. (We were) given all the necessary assurances that this is the case. Besides myself meeting Mr. President, also one of our directors, Senator George Mitchell, met with him and confirmed the same," said Kozeny.
Shortly after the first part of the interview with Viktor Kozeny was aired, the newspaper "Alternativ," with close ties to the President's Office, reacted promptly, claiming that President Aliev or his son Ilham never met with Kozeny. The paper admitted Kozeny may have been tricked by some officials, but rejected his claim that President Aliev made any commitments to his group.
However, after the second part of the interview was aired, the same paper admitted that President Aliev meets with all foreign investors, but denied again that he made any commitment to Viktor Kozeny.
The head of the State Property Committee, Nadir Nasibov, who also was mentioned in Kozeny's interview as one of the high-ranking officials involved in the transaction in his interview with the local newspaper "Zerkalo," denied the accusations made by Kozeny. Nasibov refuted Kozeny's charges that the Azerbaijani leadership deceived him and his investors group.
Viktor Kozeny in his interview expressed optimism that he will win the court case and the Azerbaijani government will finally give up and let the privatization program go on, which means letting Kozeny use his $500 million in vouchers. It is still too early to argue whether this optimism that the vouchers bought in Azerbaijan will pay off is real, or surreal.
(Mirza Khazar, 20 July, 2001)