The Voice of Mirza Xazar

Eurasia Insight:
A POLITICAL SHAKE-UP IN KAZAKHSTAN STRENGTHENS PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Joanna Lillis: 1/12/07

A recent political shake-up in Kazakhstan appears to strengthen President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s position, enhancing his

administration’s ability to accelerate economic development plans.

Nazarbayev reshuffled his cabinet after accepting former premier Danial Akhmetov’s resignation on January 8. Nazarbayev appointed Karim Masimov, a 41-year-old technocrat, to replace Akhmetov – a move approved by parliament on January 10. In addition, the president on January 11 announced a change in the Senate leadership, naming the former foreign minister, Kasymzhomart Tokayev, as the new chairman of legislature’s upper chamber, replacing Nurtay Abikayev, who will now serve as Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Russia.

Nazarbayev appointed Marat Tazhin as the country’s new foreign minister, and named Viktor Khrapunov, formerly the governor of the East Kazakhstan region, as minister for emergency situations. In addition, former economy minister Aslan Musin has become deputy premier and Galym Orazbekov – a former deputy minister with experience in the defense and oil businesses – has become trade and industry minister, while Zhanseit Tuymebayev – the former ambassador to Russia - becomes minister of education and science. The president also named a former close aide, Yerbol Orynbayev, as the prime minister’s chief-of-staff.

The new prime minister, Masimov, could push Kazakhstan in a slightly different trade direction – placing greater emphasis on China. He has an extensive background in foreign trade, and is said to be a fluent Chinese speaker. He can also speak English, Russian and Arabic. His official biography states that he studied at Wuhan University in China, and worked as an official Kazakhstani trade representative in both Hong Kong and Urumchi. From 2003-2005, he served as an aide to Nazarbayev. He was a deputy prime minister prior to his appointment to the top post.

Tazhin, the new foreign minister, quickly took steps to dampen speculation about any radical foreign policy departures, insisting that Kazakhstan would continue “to pursue a multi-vector policy governed by the economic and political interests of our country,” the Interfax news agency reported.

Although the timing of the reshuffle took some observers by surprise, the fall of Akhmetov’s government had been long predicted. Kazakhstani media outlets began speculating about Akhmetov’s fate following Nazarbayev’s reelection in late 2005. The speculation subsided briefly before reviving last autumn.

Akhmetov was never a particularly popular or charismatic premier, but in Kazakhstan what counts in a prime minister is not charm, but loyalty. And Akhmetov had plenty of that. As a staunch Nazarbayev supporter, it was Akhmetov who was sent to take over as governor of Pavlodar Region when governor-turned-opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov was arrested in 2001. Akhmetov returned to head the government in 2003, becoming the fourth prime minister in independent Kazakhstan.

Masimov is another Nazarbayev loyalist who will be able to woo foreign investors and diplomats alike; the new government may also be seen as an attempt to give fresh life to Kazakhstan’s 2009 OSCE chairmanship bid.

Addressing parliament on January 10, Nazarbayev outlined his priorities for the new government: to pursue his pet project of making Kazakhstan one of the world’s 50 most competitive countries, continue administrative reform, improve state and budget planning, develop the regions, boost the pension system, continue the focus on macroeconomic policy, train a competitive work force, improve infrastructure, bring the best of corporate management into the running of the state and diversify the economy. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The last government was tainted by scandals over the deaths of opposition leaders Zamanbek Nurkadilov and Altynbek Sarsenbayev. The accuracy of the official verdict of suicide for Nurkadilov’s 2005 death was openly questioned, while the trial and investigation into the 2006 murder of Sarsenbayev were held to be flawed. However, Interior Minister Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov, who came under heavy criticism over that case, kept his post in the new government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A new government will help distance authorities from the scandals that unsettled Kazakhstan’s political landscape. Changes in the Senate leadership more strongly signal Nazarbayev’s desire to put the Sarsenbayev murder in the past. The announcement on January 11 that Senate Chairman Abikayev would become the new envoy to Russia upstaged Akhmetov’s resignation. During the Sarsenbayev trial, Abikayev was implicated in the murder plot by the man subsequently convicted of the killing, who alleged that Abikayev had planned to stage a coup. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

With the Senate speaker constitutionally first in line to succeed the president in the event of the chief executive’s death or incapacity, the post is a key one. The new Senate leader, Tokayev, is a Nazarbayev loyalist who is also seen as a significant player in his own right, and who is said to lead one of the most influential interest groups within the governing establishment.

Local political observers believe Tokayev - a former premier often tipped as a leading presidential possibility – is the biggest winner in the reshuffle. Another group deemed to have gained is that of Timur Kulibayev, the president’s second son-in-law, as Masimov is rumored to be his associate.

What remains unclear is the effect of the reshuffle on the president’s eldest daughter and son-in-law, Dariga Nazarbayeva and Rakhat Aliyev. With Nazarbayev engaged in constant maneuverings to balance the interests of the rival clans, observers will be closely watching for further moves.

The change of government should be viewed as part of wider intrigues. Nazarbayev was not necessarily dissatisfied with the Akhmetov cabinet’s performance. It was perhaps more a move driven by the needs of the moment: the president wants to shore up the executive – in much the same manner that he strengthened the legislative branch by vastly expanding the presidential party -- as he enters a key phase of what is expected to be his last term in office. Nazarbayev aims to ensure that when the presidential succession does occur, it takes place in an orderly manner, and follows the course he desires. Indeed, even while they continue to maneuver around the president, all the interest groups are keen to promote a stable transfer of power. The fall of the government and the change of senate leadership should be viewed in the context of maneuverings to secure the post-Nazarbayev era.

Editor’s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.

(eurasianet.org)

Blasphemy Row Inflames Azerbaijan
Islamists say journalist who allegedly impugned Islam deserves to die.

By Kenan Guluzade in Nardaran

For the past three weeks, residents of the village of Nardaran, close to Baku, have been demonstrating every Friday to demand severe punishment of Azerbaijani journalist Rafik Taghi, who is accused of having insulted the Prophet Mohammed in an article published by the little-known Azerbaijani newspaper, Senet.

The case of the journalist, who is now serving a two-month prison sentence, demonstrates that Islamic sentiment is strong in Azerbaijan and has complicated relations with Azerbaijan’s southern neighbour, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Nardaran, a village with strong Islamic traditions, has been leading the protests. On November 17, Haji Ali, one of the leaders of the local religious community, summoned crowds by striking a stone against a pillar in Imam Husein square in the centre of the village. Teenagers, who had climbed on a wall, joined him, banging iron rods against a gas pipe. This noisy call to action reverberated through the village.

By three o’clock, the square was teeming with devout believers, who form an overwhelming majority in the village. “Last week we, the residents of Nardaran, condemned Rafik Taghi and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper”, said Haji Ali, beginning his speech. “Our religion knows only one punishment for such people, which is execution. This is not our decision, this is what our holy book prescribes. The authorities sentenced the journalists to two weeks in custody. But that is not enough!”

Nardaran became famous after bloody clashes between its residents and police in 2002. (See Azerbaijan: Rebel Village Remains Defiant, CRS 133, June 13, 2002). Since then, the village has become a stronghold for Shia Islamists opposed to the government. All walls on its narrow streets are covered with religious inscriptions, and locals are keen to vent their anger against the authorities in Baku.

The latest row began at the beginning of this month, when Senet (Trade), a Baku-based bimonthly with a circulation of 2000 copies, published an article by Taghi entitled “Europe and us”. The author criticised Azerbaijanis’ lifestyle and made some remarks about the Prophet Mohammed, which many of the country’s Muslims interpreted as insulting. Whether Nardaran’s residents had heard about Senet before, the controversy around the article found its way into the village, causing a storm of outrage that believers from surrounding villages were quick to support.

Protesters carried banners with religious inscriptions and placards saying “Death to Israel!” All speeches were met with a loud “Allahu Akbar!” Guests from other villages spoke out to express their support for Nardaran. American and Israel flags were brought to the square just to be tramped on and burnt.

“We declare that if these people are not sentenced to life imprisonment, we will take measures to punish them by ourselves,” said Haji Ali. “It’s a pity that there’s no death penalty in our country. We are told that their houses are being guarded, but let them hear us vow - Muslims never take vengeance on women and children. No one will touch their families. We’ve heard that Rafik Taghi’s family members have asked Denmark for political asylum, but no matter how things turn out nothing bad is going to happen to them. Rafik Taghi is the only one we want to have punished.”

As well as being a journalist and publicist, Taghi is also a professional cardiologist. He is well known for voicing ideas against the current of general public opinion. In other articles, he has made scathing comments about Azerbaijan’s national poet Samed Vurgun, chairman of the Writers Union Anar and other famous people.

Taghi and his editor Samir Sadagatoglu were arrested in mid-November and sentenced to two months in jail for kindling religious intolerance.

However, the villagers of Nardaran rejected the verdict and are continuing their protests, demanding that the two journalists be punished with a life sentence at least, burning US and Israel flags and calling for “an end to all supporters of world Zionism”.

Hajiaga Nuriev, one of the village’s elders and chairman of Azerbaijan’s Islamic Party, suggested Taghi was part of a wider conspiracy. “Both domestic and foreign forces have an interest in this,” he said. “We think that people such as Rafik Taghi are acting on behalf of international Zionism and Armenia, and they have deliberately damaged Azerbaijan’s credibility with its brothers-in-faith.

“In this situation, the residents of Nardaran could not have acted otherwise…to the enemies of Islam… who discredited Azerbaijan in the eyes of the world. This blasphemy ought to be punished.”

Hajiaga said through their rejection of the court’s sentence, the people of Naradaran had rescued the country’s reputation as chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and showed to the world that the Muslims of Azerbaijan were angered by the Senet article.

The affair has also triggered protests in Iran. APA news agency reported that around 50 people demonstrated in front of the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran on November 19 to protest against the “humiliating” article. The Iranian TV-channel Seher aired calls for the overthrow of Azerbaijan’s “anti-Islamic” government.

Then news reports said that the Iranian ayatollah Morteza Bani Fazl had offered his own home as a reward for the head of the Azerbaijani journalist, who had “insulted” the founder of Islam. “I will give my house as a reward to anyone, who kills this Azerbaijani author, who insulted the Prophet Mohammed,” said the mullah who lives in the city of Tebriz in the northwest of Iran, which has a large Azerbaijani population.

The row is likely to strain further Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Political analyst Boyukaga Agayev, who is director of the South Caucasus research centre, said, “The relations between Azerbaijan and Iran cannot be described as friendly.” He noted that the two countries already stand on opposite sides of many disputes, from the status of the Caspian Sea to relations with the US and Israel.

Vugar Aliev, press secretary for the Azerbaijani prosecutor general’s office, said, “We live in a constitutional state, and all issues should be solved in accordance with the law. What happened in Nardaran is a protest reaction to what these people did. But the law-enforcement bodies have already taken appropriate actions, and these harsh calls with regard to the two journalists are unacceptable. The police responded in a timely fashion and there remains no danger of any civilians undertaking any illegal actions against them.”

Eldar Zeynalov, director of the Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan, commented, “The situation is of the soviet-time kind – ‘I have not read it, but I do condemn it!’”

Kenan Guluzade is editor of Zerkalo newspaper in Baku

(www.iwpr.net)

Azerbaijan will not be able to supply Georgia this year with the additional gas supplies that the Georgian government is seeking in order to forestall the possibility of an energy crisis. Some experts in Baku believe that Russia’s ongoing diplomatic row with Georgia is influencing Azerbaijani policy decisions. By Rovshan Ismayilov for Eurasianet (19/10/06) Wanting to build its strategic reserves for what could prove a tense winter, Georgia sought to secure an additional 300 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field by the end of 2006, Georgian Energy Minister Nika Gelauri told a September 30 news conference in Tbilisi. Talks held 10-11 October in Baku appeared to yield positive results. But just days later, Azerbaijani officials revised their position, saying they could not guarantee the desired gas deliveries within Georgia’s timeframe. "Azerbaijan might need the gas for itself," the Trend news agency reported Azerbaijani Energy Minister Natik Aliyev as saying. "We cannot give a concrete promise yet because we do not know yet what Azerbaijan’s energy balance will be next year." Azerbaijan itself imports between 4.0 billion and 4.5 billion cubic meters a year from Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled conglomerate that also supplies the bulk of Georgia’s gas. It is Georgia’s energy dependency on Russia that has President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration worried in Tbilisi. A spy scandal, in which Georgia arrested Russian military officers, has placed Georgian-Russian relations in a deep freeze. In retaliation for the Georgian action, Russia has implemented punitive measures, including the closure of transport corridors and the suspension of postal service. Even before the spy scandal, Russia imposed economic sanctions against Georgia, most notably a ban on wine imports. Some experts believe that the Kremlin may in the coming months use its energy influence over Georgia as an additional instrument of retaliation against Tbilisi. Such concerns are rooted in the experience of January of this year, when pipelines running through Russian territory to Georgia inexplicably exploded, plunging the Caucasus country into an energy crisis. The Shah Deniz gas field, with estimated reserves of 400 billion cubic meters (bcm), was to have provided the means for Azerbaijan to meet Georgia’s demand. Gas from the field was originally expected to flow via the new Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline by the end of October. However, that opening was postponed after Turkey announced that its part of the pipeline would not be operational until the end of 2006 at the earliest. Georgia is supposed to receive 5 percent of the gas shipped to Turkey as a transit fee, plus the right to purchase an additional 5 percent of exports at a preferential price - $55 per thousand cubic meters. The 300 mcm of gas Tbilisi wanted to purchase would be in addition to these supplies. While Aliyev evaded giving a reason for the delay, some experts in Baku contend that the decision is political. "There are no technical problems which may cause a delay," asserted Ilham Shaban, an energy expert and editor of the Turan Energy Bulletin. "The pipeline running from Baku into Georgian territory is complete and ready for operation." Shaban contends that Azerbaijan may have unofficially asked British Petroleum, which leads the gas development and pipeline consortium, to postpone production until the end of 2006 in order to avoid offending Russia on this issue. At the same time, he added, the British energy company appears to be cognizant of problems recently encountered by other foreign oil companies in Russian oil exploration, and may wish to do nothing that might rankle the Kremlin. "It means that, most likely, we’re facing Russia’s energy blackmail again," Shaban said. The Azerbaijani government, however, denies that any hidden political motive exists for its decision. "Cooperation between Baku and Tbilisi was not affected by Russia’s position on Georgia. We [the Azerbaijani government] are not experiencing any pressure from Russia," a source within the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry told EurasiaNet. The differences between Russia and Georgia were discussed during an 6 October meeting in Moscow between the Azerbaijani and Russian Foreign Ministers, "and both sides expressed their understanding that the conflict should be solved as soon as possible," the source said. Energy Minister Aliyev has confirmed that Azerbaijan is prepared to provide transit to Georgia for Iranian gas supplies, but Shaban states that the country’s pipelines cannot transport more than 2 mcm of Iranian gas to Georgia per day, roughly 30 percent of Georgia’s needs. Ilgar Mammadov, a Baku-based political analyst, believes that other factors aside from Russia could have influenced the government’s announcement. An increase in Gazprom gas prices could mean an increase in transit fees for gas to Azerbaijani foe Armenia, a situation which could raise tensions between Moscow and Yerevan to Baku’s satisfaction, he suggested. "[D]ispleasure is growing within the government with the fact that Azerbaijan is making economic concessions to Georgia all the time," Mammadov added. After Azerbaijan made "serious concessions" to Georgia on transit tariffs for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Georgian government initially asked for compensation for the financial losses the Georgian port of Batumi would incur once the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project with Azerbaijan and Turkey is complete, he noted. Georgia later withdrew its demand, according to officials, but Mammadov contends that the request still rankles. Azerbaijan has granted credit to Georgia for the construction of a 29-kilometer railroad from Akhalkalaki, the main town in the predominantly ethnic Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, to Georgia’s border with Turkey, and to repair a 160-kilometer railroad from Akhalkalaki to the border with Azerbaijan. "I think that this situation has begun to irritate [President] Ilham Aliyev’s administration," Mammadov commented. Turan energy expert Shaban contends that the problem may just be a question of over-sized expectations. "Saakashvili often stated that the launching of gas production from Shah Deniz will solve Georgia’s all energy problems," Shaban said. "He made a mistake as we can see now: Georgia is still dependant on Russia’s gas." (Eurasianet)