The Voice of Mirza Xazar

A series of arrests and prison sentences for charges that include terrorism have journalists in Azerbaijan wondering if there is any sort of future for a free press.

Commentary by Karl Rahder for ISN Security Watch (25/05/07)

Increasingly bad news for freedom of expression has recently come out of Azerbaijan, the US' oil-rich ally in the Caspian Sea region, where five journalists have been sentenced to harsh prison sentences in the last few weeks in what critics say is a government campaign to stifle free speech.

Rafiq Tagi, a journalist with the independent newspaper Senet was sentenced on 3 May in Baku, the capital, to a four-year term for “inciting religious hatred,” while his editor Samir Sadagatoglu received a three-year sentence.

The prison terms and prosecution came as a result of a commentary written last November by Tagi entitled “Europe and Us,” which according to press reports compared Muslim societies such as Azerbaijan with historically Christian Europe and concluded that Islam had, on the whole, hindered social and political development.

While this sort of reflective social commentary might be the norm in the West, the outcry from some quarters in secular, Shi’ite Azerbaijan was shrill, with ultra-conservative Muslims in the village of Nadaran calling for the two men’s deaths and the public prosecutor bringing criminal charges against them.

In neighboring Iran, Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani has issued a fatwa calling for the execution of Tagi and his editor, saying on his

website: http://www.lankarani.org/eng/mes/016.html

that “it is necessary for every individual who has an access to him to kill him. The person in charge of the […] newspaper, who published such thoughts and beliefs consciously and knowingly, should be dealt with in the same manner.” Another cleric who lives in the city of Tabriz has reportedly offered his house as a reward for anyone who kills the two men.
The sentence was handed down despite protests from Azerbaijan’s embattled journalistic community, a number of non-governmental organizations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

What emerges from the trials, convictions and physical attacks over the years is an apparent pattern of coordinated assaults against freedom of speech in Azerbaijan. On 27 April, independent journalist Eynulla Fatullayev was convicted of “criminal libel” and “insult” and sentenced to 30 months in prison for allegations he purportedly made having to do with events surrounding the massacre of civilians in the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly during the 1992-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Fatullayev’s original article evidently attached some blame for the tragedy to the failure of Azerbaijani military forces to protect the town. But in the furor that followed the article, Fatullayev was charged with libeling the residents of Khojaly.

Fatullayev, perhaps Azerbaijan’s best-known opposition journalist, denies having made libelous comments, but his conviction - and the physical attack on the same day against his colleague Uzeir Jafarov - reminds critics of the government of the price they may be forced to pay when they stray too far from what is acceptable, to both the government and the conservative Shi’ite establishment.

Journalism in Azerbaijan was a high-risk endeavor even before the 2005 murder of Elmar Huseynov, editor of the independent Monitor newspaper, and a friend of Fatullayev’s. It clearly remains a high-risk endeavor.

In October last year, well-known poet and opposition journalist Sakit Zahidov was convicted on charges of illegal possession and use of drugs. The charges were widely believed to be politically oriented, with the arrest coming only three days after Ali Akhmedov, the executive secretary of Azerbaijan's ruling New Azerbaijan Party, called for Zahidov’s arrest for his alleged “slanders” against government officials.

Zahidov’s brother Ganimat happens to be the chief editor of the opposition newspaper Azadlig, which has been a thorn in the side of the government for years and was ejected from its office space in 2006 along with the Turan News Agency and the Popular Front Party.

Last week, Rovshan Karbili - the editor of opposition newspaper Mukhalifat - and reporter Yashar Agazade were sentenced to two and a half years in prison (identical to Fatulayev’s sentence) for libel in connection with an article that accused Jalal Aliyev, an uncle of President Ilham Aliyev, of corruption.

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Miklos Haraszti expressed “shock” over the sentence in a statement to the press.

"Azerbaijan's relentless persecution of journalists annihilates the security of journalism, a major OSCE commitment," said Haraszti.

The conviction and sentence came less than three weeks after a meeting between Haraszti and President Aliyev, during which the OSCE representative asked the president to halt the persecution of journalists, reminding Aliyev that "Azerbaijan today is the country in the OSCE region with the highest number of journalists in prison […]"

The US embassy in Baku issued a statement after the most recent convictions, saying that the imprisonment of seven journalists in toto in Azerbaijan "is part of a trend of pressure - including violence, threats and libel cases - that runs counter to Azerbaijan's stated commitment to media freedom. Journalists in democratic countries are not imprisoned for exercising freedom of expression. We urge the Azerbaijani government to remove libel from the criminal code and to take steps to create the necessary conditions for media freedom."
In 2005, Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that monitors democratic development, downgraded Azerbaijan from "partly free" to "not free."

Finally, on 21 May, authorities closed down the offices of Fatullayev’s newspaper Real Azerbaijan as well as another opposition paper, the Azerbaijan Daily, two of the most popular newspapers in the country. While the government says the closure was due to maintenance and fire safety issues, no other tenants in the building were evicted. And as of 23 May, Fatullayev faces additional charges of "making a terrorist threat," a development that could extend his prison term for many years.

The independent media are being all but shut down in Azerbaijan. The terrorism charges against Fatullayev and the stiff sentences handed out for a harmless editorial and criticism of a member of the president’s family send a message to the press that the confines for freedom of expression in Azerbaijan are becoming more circumscribed.

It is hard to imagine that the remaining opposition newspapers such as Azadlig will tone down their editorial coverage, although independent television network ANS is perceived by many to have done just that since it was allowed back on the air last year after a brief closure. The atmosphere in the country has certainly chilled in over the course of the past couple of weeks, and the government now will have to decide if it has communicated the new rules with sufficient clarity or whether more arrests are in the offing.

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Karl Rahder has taught US foreign policy and international history at colleges and universities in the US and Azerbaijan. In 2004, he was a Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan with the Civic Education Project, an academic program funded by the Soros Foundations and the US Department of State. He is currently based in Chicago.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17659

Civil Society:
Joanna Lillis: 4/03/07

A fatal clash between ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Chechens in a village in south-eastern Kazakhstan has raised questions about whether the country’s much-touted ethnic harmony is under threat, and whether socio-economic tensions are endangering stability in this booming state.

The unrest began March 17 with a fight over a game of billiards and ended with an attack on the house of a Chechen family that left five dead. Eyewitnesses say violence broke out in the village of Malovodnoye, about 80 kilometers east of Almaty, when Takhir Makhmakhanov, an ethnic Chechen from the neighboring village of Kazatkom, refused to concede defeat to his rival, Baurzhan Salimbayev, an ethnic Kazakh. After the two came to blows, Salimbayev left the billiards hall, but was chased by Makhmakhanov, who ran into him in a jeep and broke his leg, then shot him in the other leg.

The following day, Salimbayev went to the Makhmakhanov family home in the neighboring village with a convoy of some 50 carloads of supporters that besieged the house. Eyewitnesses say shots were fired from inside. In the ensuing fracas, nine people were injured. Three died that day and two more subsequently died after being hospitalized. Three of the dead were brothers of Takhir Makhmakhanov, who is now on the run. The Makhmakhanov family disputes this version of events, saying the attack was long planned and their house was fired on from the crowd.

Some 50 people have been arrested and face charges ranging from premeditated murder to hooliganism and damage to property. The incident was followed by rallies in which participants demanded the family’s removal from the village.

In response to the clashes, riot police were brought in from across Almaty Region to restore order. Approaches to both villages remain heavily guarded. In late March, police were patrolling approaches to Malovodnoye, which lies on a key artery linking Kazakhstan’s commercial capital with China. In Kazatkom, some 10 kilometers across the open steppe, police were guarding the entrance to the village, where the charred remains of the Makhmakhanovs’ home stand: the house was set on fire by the angry crowd. The family has been moved to an undisclosed, secure location.

“It’s quiet on the streets -- you can see for yourself,” a senior police officer, who declined to identify himself, told EurasiaNet as he stood guard at the emergency headquarters set up in Malovodnoye. Local authorities declined to comment.

News of five deaths over a game of billiards caused consternation in Kazakhstan, which prides itself on social stability and ethnic harmony. Home to over 130 ethnic groups, Kazakhstan cannot afford ethnic discord. Almaty Region’s Enbek District, where the clash occurred, is home to large numbers of Turks, Chechens, Uighurs and Kurds, who, according to local MP Serik Abdrakhmanov, comprise more than half of the district’s population. The presence of tens of thousands of Chechens in Kazakhstan today is linked to a decision made by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin to deport the ethnic group en masse during World War II.

Some see Kazakhstan’s diversity as a source of tension. “Relations [between ethnic communities] are bad,” a woman out shopping in Malovodnoye told EurasiaNet on condition of anonymity.

A fellow villager, who also declined to identify himself, disagreed. “[Ethnicity] could be just coincidence. [The fight] was just a settling of scores,” he said.

Both, however, pointed to discrepancies in living standards among villagers as a factor behind the incident. An income gap is readily evident: it is a common sight for large houses -- such as that belonging to the Makhmakhanov family in nearby Kazatkom -- to stand near the small, dilapidated houses of their less well-off neighbors.

The ethnicities of those involved in the clash have attracted media, yet the roots of the incident may lie elsewhere. As Kazakhstan’s oil-rich economy booms -- growing at a roughly double-digit rate for the last six years -- the rich-poor and rural-urban divides have widened, leading to social discontent.

While Kazakhstan’s elite and burgeoning middle class have been riding the oil boom, the poor have struggled to adapt to market conditions. Many have grown poorer, battling to reconcile rising prices with low wages. Sixteen percent of the population lives on less than 2 dollars per day, according to UNDP figures.

In a March 28 statement, Abdrakhmanov, the local MP, called for a sober evaluation of the underlying causes of the clash, which lie “beyond the boundaries of these villages.” With local authorities understaffed, under-resourced and lacking real power in Kazakhstan’s centralized system, people have little influence over “vital local issues: the sale of land plots, property, the use of water resources.”

“Discontent is growing in the villages,” Abdrakhmanov added. “Rural relations are becoming more and more acute, especially near cities. Despite a reduction in the number of cattle, there is a lack of pasture and of land to make hay, because land is not always allocated fairly,” the statement continued.

Land is a sensitive topic. As prices for land and housing rocket, the less well-off are coming under increasing economic stress. Land disputes on the outskirts of Almaty led to clashes between inhabitants and police last summer, as people accused of settling there illegally were evicted. Observers have pointed to a perception among ordinary people that the rich and powerful are protected by a system in which corruption is endemic. “Shadow business is flourishing in many areas under the ‘protection’ of law-enforcement structures,” Abdrakhmanov alleged. Talgat Ryskulbekov, the deputy head of the Spirit of December nationalist movement who visited the troubled villages to mediate, agrees that inhabitants have a perception that the rich can operate under impunity. “For the local authorities and the police, money talks,” Ryskulbekov told EurasiaNet.

Ryskulbekov ruled out an ethnic motive: “Some people want to say it was something ethnic. Nothing of the sort!”

Chechen community leader Akhmed Muradov has condemned police inaction over rumors that had been circulating of trouble between the communities, and accused forces which oppose stability of being behind events.

Dos Kushim, leader of the Fate of the Nation nationalist movement, points to historical inequities as the root of conflict. “I think… the whole problem lies in the social and -- no less important -- moral suppression of the Kazakhs that has emerged historically,” he said in remarks carried on the Zonakz.net website. “Under the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs’ language, culture and self-identification were given no expression, and after the fall of the USSR and with the gaining of independence a mass of problems remain unresolved.”

This latest bout of unrest is the third in six months. In October 2006, discontent at labor conditions in the western oilfields led to a mass brawl between Kazakh and Turkish workers at Tengiz, which saw over 200 injured. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In November, fighting erupted between up to 300 ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Uighurs in the village of Shelek, 20 kilometers from Malovodnoye. As such clashes become more frequent, the government needs to address the root causes to preserve the ethnic harmony it prides itself on.

Editor’s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.

(www.eurasianet.org)

Eurasia Insight:
A POLITICAL SHAKE-UP IN KAZAKHSTAN STRENGTHENS PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Joanna Lillis: 1/12/07

A recent political shake-up in Kazakhstan appears to strengthen President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s position, enhancing his

administration’s ability to accelerate economic development plans.

Nazarbayev reshuffled his cabinet after accepting former premier Danial Akhmetov’s resignation on January 8. Nazarbayev appointed Karim Masimov, a 41-year-old technocrat, to replace Akhmetov – a move approved by parliament on January 10. In addition, the president on January 11 announced a change in the Senate leadership, naming the former foreign minister, Kasymzhomart Tokayev, as the new chairman of legislature’s upper chamber, replacing Nurtay Abikayev, who will now serve as Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Russia.

Nazarbayev appointed Marat Tazhin as the country’s new foreign minister, and named Viktor Khrapunov, formerly the governor of the East Kazakhstan region, as minister for emergency situations. In addition, former economy minister Aslan Musin has become deputy premier and Galym Orazbekov – a former deputy minister with experience in the defense and oil businesses – has become trade and industry minister, while Zhanseit Tuymebayev – the former ambassador to Russia - becomes minister of education and science. The president also named a former close aide, Yerbol Orynbayev, as the prime minister’s chief-of-staff.

The new prime minister, Masimov, could push Kazakhstan in a slightly different trade direction – placing greater emphasis on China. He has an extensive background in foreign trade, and is said to be a fluent Chinese speaker. He can also speak English, Russian and Arabic. His official biography states that he studied at Wuhan University in China, and worked as an official Kazakhstani trade representative in both Hong Kong and Urumchi. From 2003-2005, he served as an aide to Nazarbayev. He was a deputy prime minister prior to his appointment to the top post.

Tazhin, the new foreign minister, quickly took steps to dampen speculation about any radical foreign policy departures, insisting that Kazakhstan would continue “to pursue a multi-vector policy governed by the economic and political interests of our country,” the Interfax news agency reported.

Although the timing of the reshuffle took some observers by surprise, the fall of Akhmetov’s government had been long predicted. Kazakhstani media outlets began speculating about Akhmetov’s fate following Nazarbayev’s reelection in late 2005. The speculation subsided briefly before reviving last autumn.

Akhmetov was never a particularly popular or charismatic premier, but in Kazakhstan what counts in a prime minister is not charm, but loyalty. And Akhmetov had plenty of that. As a staunch Nazarbayev supporter, it was Akhmetov who was sent to take over as governor of Pavlodar Region when governor-turned-opposition leader Galymzhan Zhakiyanov was arrested in 2001. Akhmetov returned to head the government in 2003, becoming the fourth prime minister in independent Kazakhstan.

Masimov is another Nazarbayev loyalist who will be able to woo foreign investors and diplomats alike; the new government may also be seen as an attempt to give fresh life to Kazakhstan’s 2009 OSCE chairmanship bid.

Addressing parliament on January 10, Nazarbayev outlined his priorities for the new government: to pursue his pet project of making Kazakhstan one of the world’s 50 most competitive countries, continue administrative reform, improve state and budget planning, develop the regions, boost the pension system, continue the focus on macroeconomic policy, train a competitive work force, improve infrastructure, bring the best of corporate management into the running of the state and diversify the economy. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The last government was tainted by scandals over the deaths of opposition leaders Zamanbek Nurkadilov and Altynbek Sarsenbayev. The accuracy of the official verdict of suicide for Nurkadilov’s 2005 death was openly questioned, while the trial and investigation into the 2006 murder of Sarsenbayev were held to be flawed. However, Interior Minister Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov, who came under heavy criticism over that case, kept his post in the new government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A new government will help distance authorities from the scandals that unsettled Kazakhstan’s political landscape. Changes in the Senate leadership more strongly signal Nazarbayev’s desire to put the Sarsenbayev murder in the past. The announcement on January 11 that Senate Chairman Abikayev would become the new envoy to Russia upstaged Akhmetov’s resignation. During the Sarsenbayev trial, Abikayev was implicated in the murder plot by the man subsequently convicted of the killing, who alleged that Abikayev had planned to stage a coup. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

With the Senate speaker constitutionally first in line to succeed the president in the event of the chief executive’s death or incapacity, the post is a key one. The new Senate leader, Tokayev, is a Nazarbayev loyalist who is also seen as a significant player in his own right, and who is said to lead one of the most influential interest groups within the governing establishment.

Local political observers believe Tokayev - a former premier often tipped as a leading presidential possibility – is the biggest winner in the reshuffle. Another group deemed to have gained is that of Timur Kulibayev, the president’s second son-in-law, as Masimov is rumored to be his associate.

What remains unclear is the effect of the reshuffle on the president’s eldest daughter and son-in-law, Dariga Nazarbayeva and Rakhat Aliyev. With Nazarbayev engaged in constant maneuverings to balance the interests of the rival clans, observers will be closely watching for further moves.

The change of government should be viewed as part of wider intrigues. Nazarbayev was not necessarily dissatisfied with the Akhmetov cabinet’s performance. It was perhaps more a move driven by the needs of the moment: the president wants to shore up the executive – in much the same manner that he strengthened the legislative branch by vastly expanding the presidential party -- as he enters a key phase of what is expected to be his last term in office. Nazarbayev aims to ensure that when the presidential succession does occur, it takes place in an orderly manner, and follows the course he desires. Indeed, even while they continue to maneuver around the president, all the interest groups are keen to promote a stable transfer of power. The fall of the government and the change of senate leadership should be viewed in the context of maneuverings to secure the post-Nazarbayev era.

Editor’s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.

(eurasianet.org)