The Voice of Mirza Xazar

There is no doubt that most of the recent commentaries that have appeared in opposition newspapers about Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev's health and his designs to have his son, Ilham, succeed him as president contain some exaggerated or at least partially biased ideas.
It is not surprising, since an attempt by a weak opposition to wage it's campaign against the 78-year-old president using propaganda might be considered a "natural" form of politics in Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt and too many indications that the fight to be Aliev's successor has begun in Azerbaijan. Rumors, reports, and commentaries on this subject are persistent. And Aliev's poor appearance on TV screens is too obvious to doubt that his health is not good -- contrary to what he and his son claim or what the official media tells the public. The Turkish TV Channel D, in a report on 26 April on the summit of Turkic-speaking countries, described the appearance of the Azerbaijani president in an unusually blatant manner: "Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev's gaunt appearance drew the attention of many people."
The remark is neither diplomatic nor polite, of course. But it might serve as an indicator of a new approach of in the Turkish media and perhaps the Turkish government towards Aliev. This fact is, of course, an external nuance of the fight to be Aliev's heir that is going on in Azerbaijan. It might have and might not have an impact on the battle for succession, since not Turkey, but maybe Russia and Iran also are interested to have their own "input" into this process. But there is no doubt that the main game is being played in Baku.
Aliev continues to show his determination to have Ilham succeed him as president. In his remarks at the Baku airport on 25 April before his flight to Ankara, Aliev praised Ilham's "great" speech in Strasbourg at a session of the Council of Europe. The Russian-language newspaper "Zerkalo," in a commentary on 26 April, showed confidence that the time has arrived for the anointed successor (Ilham) to appear in public. "The successor has been chosen and the only issue on agenda is to legitimize him," comments the paper.
It seems "Zerkalo" is right. The time is arriving. But there are a lot of problems and difficulties in getting a transition of power to occur at the right time. Aliev's decision to have his son be the next president angered and frightened many of his close allies within his own elite from the Nakhichevan "club." Judging from reports published in the local press, a fierce struggle to neutralize potential contenders -- Ramiz Mehtiev, the president's chief of staff, Ali Insanov, the health minister, and Kamaladdin Heidarov, head of the powerful state customs committee, are in the center of this ongoing infighting. According to some observers in Baku, Aliev's decision to tab his son as the heir apparent not only prompted a fight within the Nakhichevan "clan" for succession, but alienated most of his supporters among those people from Nakhichevan. Therefore, according to the same sources, even if Aliev succeeds to have his son appointed or elected as the next president, the new president will fail to have strong support among from not only the general public, but also from his own "kinsmen" from Nakhichevan.
This is considered to be the main weakness of Ilham. Therefore, a common question being asked in Baku in this regard is: How could Ilham Aliev survive in power without the support from his own "clan," which his father enjoyed for about 30 years? And the questions continue: Will Ilham be able to stay in power for a long time, as his father did? What can Azerbaijan expect from Ilham, if his father manages to bring him to power? How would the main outside players in the Caucasus -- Russia, the West, Iran, and Turkey react to such a power transition in Azerbaijan? And finally, will the opposition in Baku and some opposition leaders in exile actually accept this form of "natural" succession in Azerbaijan or not? These are the questions of the day. The answers will come and most likely rather soon.
(Mirza Khazar - 27 April 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

An attempt by several hundred supporters of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party to hold a protest demonstration in the center of Baku on 21 April was the first opposition protest action since the Karabakh war invalids were forced to stop a month-long hunger- strike in February. Police resorted to brute force to prevent the ADP supporters from holding an unauthorized rally to demand the release of political prisoners, but that does not detract from the implications of the action for the political situation in Azerbaijan.
Isa Gambar, head of the main opposition Musavat party, expressed support for the ADP's protest action in an interview published in the newspaper "Azadliq" on April 24. Gambar added that the Musavat party too is preparing for mass actions of protest. Azerbaijan Democratic Party chairman Rasul Quliev in his interview with "Hurriyyet" on April 24, suggested that consecutive protest rallies will force the present government to resign. One can interpret this suggestion as wishful thinking. But it would be a mistake either to overestimate the strength of the opposition, mainly its ability to unite or to underestimate President Heydar Aliev's ability to deal with such a development.
But we should not forget that the situation in which Heydar Aliev is forced to operate today is different from similar situations in the past. Heydar Aliev is now 78 and he is not physically fit. He is in the middle of crucial peace talks with Armenia, and it is not clear what he will sign and how the public and political parties in Azerbaijan will react. He did not manage to convince the main players in Caucasus to support his son, Ilham as his successor. His foreign policy towards Turkey, Iran, Russia and the West is not ideal at the moment. Tensions are mounting between Azerbaijan and Iran. Aliev's recent attempts to restore "fraternal" relations with Russia will demand from him and from Azerbaijan as a state a very high price. Aliev's attempt (in an effort to strengthen his own position) to play a very complicated and contradictory game between Russia and the United States, and his desire to win this game, does not seem to be a very sophisticated and successful policy.
Aliev's relations with Turkey are an obvious example of the failure of such a "twisted policy." Some observers believe that President Aliev is intentionally creating problems in relations with Turkey in order to gain Russian "kindness." This opinion might prove to be wrong or right. Heydar Aliev will leave for Ankara on April 25 to attend a summit of heads of states of Turkic speaking countries in Istanbul the following day. Not the summit as such, but relations between the Aliev leadership and Ankara will dominate his meetings with Turkish officials. Relations between two countries are at the worst point since Suleyman Demirel left office as President of Turkey a year ago. It is not only official Baku that is to blame for the worsening of relations with Ankara. The failure of the Turkish side to accept Turcophone countries as equal partners is also partly to blame for the present coolness in relations with Baku.
The Azerbaijani press is unanimous that Aliev will face tough questions in Ankara during his visit there. But it is possible that the Turkish side might also face such tough questions from Azerbaijani president. Aliev with his rich political experience managed to overcome all obstacles and survive in the past 30 years. Will he at this crucial moment of his career be able to overcome not only external pressures but the infighting expected to erupt within his immediate circle in the near future over who is best qualified to succeed him as president?
(Mirza Khazar - 24 April 2001)
RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report

Analysis and opinions published in the Azerbaijani press on the peace talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, Heidar Aliev and Robert Kocharian, respectively, suggest low expectations for the talks among observers, analysts, and even the general public in Baku on the outcome of meeting in Key West.
Observers in the Azerbaijani capital point out that the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE have failed to present new peace proposals to the sides in Florida. By presenting old and even contradictory proposals from 1997-1998, the OSCE co-chairmen admit that they do not have any fresh ideas on how to solve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Aliev's remarks at Key West on 3 April accusing the international community of not doing enough to end the conflict can be evaluated differently. It is possible that Aliev is securing himself a safe retreat in the case that the Key West talks fail. Therefore, according to some observers, one should not expect any real breakthrough in the Key West talks.
Who will emerge the "winner" in Florida is another question discussed among Azerbaijani politicians and observers. Most local commentators agree that since the Key West talks will not produce any concrete results in resolving the Karabakh conflict, the talks can help to keep the peace process alive. But on the other hand, Aliev, Kocharian, and maybe even U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell could all come out as symbolic winners. Aliev and Kocharian will show the public how tough they are in protecting and defending their national interests, and, in doing so, will make public relations gains back home in Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Furthermore, Aliev, according to local press comments, can easily continue his efforts to have his son become his successor, but could at the same time run into trouble at home if he fails to resolve the Karabakh conflict as the plight of several hundred thousand refugees is of great concern to the public. The peace negotiations could help the Azerbaijani government distract public attention from widespread corruption and even criticism from abroad, according to local observers. Many others believe that a peace deal would mean a continuation of the poverty and corruption that plagues Azerbaijani society. One winner might be U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who, according to some comments in the international media, will be able to show his skills as a proficient diplomat while gaining extensive and badly needed exposure by the international media. The possible winners are known. But who, if anyone, will be the losers? This question remains open in Baku. (Mirza Khazar)

10 April 2001
What Happened In Key West?

U.S. President George W. Bush's meeting with the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents on 9 April increased hopes for a peaceful solution of the Karabakh conflict in the near future. But the real outcome of the peace talks between Armenian President Robert Kocharian, Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev and the three Minsk Group co-chairmen in Key West is still not clear.
Contradictory and deeply different reactions to the latest round of peace talks in Florida from Armenian and Azerbaijani officials have deepened uncertainty and doubts in Azerbaijan surrounding the Key West talks. Optimistic statements by Armenian government officials, and obviously cool reactions from Azerbaijani officials are still feeding this uncertainty. More and more politicians and ordinary citizens are asking how realistic the Armenian optimism is, and if there are indeed grounds for that optimism, then how should the Azerbaijani public understand the neutral and cool statements of officials close to prezident Aliev.
There are many different explanations expressed in Azerbaijani media following Key West talks. Some politicians claim the Azerbaijani president has made serious concessions to the Armenian side and has therefore chosen to remain silent on the outcome of peace talks. Other politicians express different views. They suggest that the excitement on the Armenian side could be an attempt to discredit the Azerbaijani leadership at home and to put more pressure on Heidar Aliev to agree to a peace accord promptly.
It is hard to support or reject any of these opinions. But the main question remains open - What happened in Key West? Is there any ground for Armenian optimism? Judging from Aliev's short and nervy statement in Washington after his meeting with the U.S. president, these questions are annoying the Azerbaijani leadership too. In his response to a reporter's question - How much of progress was made during the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh last week in Key West, Florida, Aliev responded with one sentence: " I haven't had the chance to measure how close we are now." This statement does not solve the problem. The main problem is: who will tell the Azerbaijani public what really happened in Key West? (Mirza Khazar) RFE/RL Azerbaijan Report